

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

NATIONAL REPORT

Prepared by Government of Republic of Armenia for Tenth Review Meeting on 13-24 April 2026

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A. INTRODUCTION

The National Report of the Republic of Armenia (RA) provides an overview on the implementation of the obligations undertaken by the country under the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

The nuclear program of the RA is concentrated on bringing the national legal and regulatory infrastructure on nuclear and radiation safety in line with the IAEA safety standards and the EU directives under the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) entered into force on March 01, 2021, continuous safety improvement of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (hereinafter referred to as Armenian NPP) and development of efforts to ensure the country's energy security and independence.

The national report has been prepared in accordance with the Guidelines regarding the National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety and addresses the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

B. SUMMARY

The RA ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety on September 24, 1997.

This report addresses changes in the national legislation, describes practices, challenges and issues related to the nuclear safety, the licensing system, as well as demonstrates the efforts put to improve the nuclear safety by enhancing the national arrangements and developing the international cooperation to meet the obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

The RA operates one nuclear power plant – Armenian NPP Unit № 2. The Armenian NPP Unit № 2 is operated in accordance with the license granted by the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) in 2011 and renewed in 2021. Armenian NPP provides in average 45% of the electricity consumed in the country and is a very important component of the national economy that ensures the energy security of the country. The safety measures as specified in the List of the Armenian NPP Safety Upgrades are continuously implemented to improve the safety level of the Armenian NPP.

The "Law on Construction of New NPP Unit(s) in the Republic of Armenia" was adopted on October 27, 2009.

The RA Government Decree №48-L adopted on January 14, 2021 on approval of the strategic plan for the development of the energy sector of the Republic of Armenia (up to 2040), the schedule ensuring the implementation of the strategic plan for the development of the energy sector of the Republic of Armenia (up to 2040) and revoking a number of the RA Government decrees, outlines the energy development action plan and schedule up to 2040. The document outlines the Government's intention to extend the Armenian NPP Unit №2 lifetime as well as to construct nuclear power plant unit(s).

The measures undertaken by the RA to implement the obligations undertaken under the Convention on Nuclear Safety take into account the relevant principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, i.e. regular and systematic safety assessments are performed and the safety improvements are implemented at Armenian NPP in accordance with the approved programs and schedules; the national requirements

and regulations are developed and updated in accordance with the IAEA safety standards and good international practices. The mentioned information is addressed in the relevant chapters of this national report, in particular in the chapters 1, 9,12,13,14 respectively.

International peer review missions hosted by the Republic of Armenia in the reporting period

The WANO Moscow Center implemented the following missions over the last years.

- Peer review mission in 2022 and in 2025
- Support mission on the topic "Effectiveness of the management system. Early identification of signs of declining performance" in 2022
- Follow-up corporate review mission in 2022
- Support missions on the topic "Enhanced monitoring" in 2023 and 2024
- Support mission on the topic "Corporate Oversight" in 2024.

SALTO Follow-up Mission

The IAEA will conduct a Safety Aspects of Long-Term Operation (SALTO) follow-up mission at the Armenian NPP Unit №2 from 06 to 10 October 2025. The SALTO follow-up mission will review the progress in addressing each issue from the 2021 SALTO mission.

Challenges identified during 8th and 9the Joint Review Meeting for Armenia:

Challenge 1: Construction of the new NPP unit(s) before decommissioning ANPP Unit No 2.

The RA Government Decree №48-L adopted on January 14, 2021 on approval of the strategic plan for the development of the energy sector of the Republic of Armenia (up to 2040), the schedule ensuring the implementation of the strategic plan for the development of the energy sector of the Republic of Armenia (up to 2040) and revoking a number of the RA Government decrees, outlines the energy development action plan and schedule up to 2040. The document outlines the Government's intention to extend the Armenian NPP Unit №2 lifetime as well as to construct nuclear power plant unit(s).

The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) is currently actively working on the implementation of the "Lifetime Extension-2" program, with plans to justify the safe operation of the ANPP Unit №2 until 2036. In parallel, work is also underway on the construction of new nuclear facility/facilities. Based on the results of the energy demand analysis, it was determined that "traditional" large-capacity projects do not meet the requirements of the Republic of Armenia, and nuclear power plants with Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are considered more suitable.

For this purpose, in 2023 the Government of the Republic of Armenia established an interministerial working group (including the RA Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure, the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, and the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant), which has been actively engaged in studying nuclear power unit designs proposed by various international suppliers. In particular, the focus has been on studying the designs proposed by organizations developing small modular reactors.

As a result of the preliminary analysis, it was decided to select only light-water type reactors and to consider only those designs that are already available and it is possible to build and operate an appropriate

facility with them by 2036. In this context, various designs are being analyzed by Armenian experts, including NuScale, Holtec SMR-300, WH AP-300, BWRX-300, RITM-200, i-SMR, and other projects. With the support of international experts and using IAEA guidelines, a questionnaire consisting of about 300 questions was prepared and presented to various project designers, based on the answers to which a choice will be made between the projects,

Parallel work is being carried out on the development of the technical specifications, with the involvement of international experts as well. Work is also being carried out to analyze financing methods in order to select the most acceptable option.

ANRA's work on the review of national legislation is presented in Section 2.2 and Challenge 4.

In order coordinate the construction of new nuclear power unit(s) in the Republic of Armenia, the Government of Armenia established a company (NEPIO) by the Government Decree No. 1198-N dated August 1, 2024, titled "On the Establishment of a Closed Joint-Stock Company for the Management of the Program for the Construction of a New Nuclear Power Unit(s) in the Republic of Armenia." The company is currently in the staffing phase.

The progress of the completed and ongoing activities indicates that the challenge has not been fully resolved, but it is currently under "manageable" control.

Challenge 2: Licensing the second term of the ANPP LTO

The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) is currently actively working on the implementation of the "Lifetime Extension-2" program, with plans to justify the safe operation of the ANPP Unit №2 until 2036.

Taking into account the experience gained from the lifetime extension of Unit 2 of the ANPP, regular meetings of the Coordinating Council for the "Lifetime Extension 2" program are being held, and professional working meetings between the ANPP and ANRA are being conducted more frequently. The activities and licensing plan of the "Lifetime Extension 2" program have been agreed upon with ANRA and approved by the Government of the Republic of Armenia.

The implementation of the "Lifetime Extension 2" program for the ANPP Unit № 2 is under the regular supervision of the Government of the Republic of Armenia.

The progress of the completed and ongoing activities indicates that the challenge has not been fully resolved, but it is currently under "manageable" control.

Challenge 3: Recruitment and training of personnel for the ANRA

The issue of recruiting and training personnel for ANRA and its technical support organization is high priority, considering the current and planned activities in the field of nuclear energy use.

- Operation of the existing NPP until 2036, including safety enhancement activities;
- Expansion and operation of the spent nuclear fuel storage facility for at least 50 years, and possible extension of the operational lifetime;
- Reprocessing and long-term storage or disposal of radioactive waste generated from the operation of nuclear energy facilities;
- Decommissioning of the operating NPP units;
- Construction and operation of a new nuclear power plant at least until 2090;
- Development of nuclear medicine and the use of radioactive sources.

At all stages of the mentioned activities, ensuring adequate staffing of the regulatory authority and the technical support organization is a crucial issue for proper safety regulation and oversight. International experience shows that to start the construction process of a new NPP, the regulatory authority requires a professional staff of about 45 people per power unit. In the case of constructing a new NPP or other nuclear energy facilities, the professional staff of the regulatory authority should be expanded accordingly. The recruitment of specialists will not be carried out evenly over the years, a greater number of specialists will be needed during the construction phase of the new NPP.

Taking into account the age limit of the existing specialists and the time required for their retraining, it is necessary to create conditions for recruiting and training new personnel over the next five years, average of 6-8 specialists per year.

The Government of the Republic of Armenia, recognizing the importance of the nuclear energy sector, is undertaking a number of measures to ensure the training, retraining, and employment of young specialists in relevant organizations within the field.

The Government of the Republic of Armenia submits state-funded training applications to the Faculty of Physics at Yerevan State University, as well as to the Faculty of Energy at the Armenian State University of Architecture and Construction. During their studies, the students are also granted the right to deferment.

The Government of the Republic of Armenia, at the initiative of ANRA, made certain changes to the ANRA structure of ANRA. The specialists with the appropriate qualifications from the ANRA's Nuclear Safety and Radiation Safety Departments from civil servant's status have become civil contractors, starting from 2025. Based on this change their remuneration has increased. At the same time, based on the mentioned Government Decree, additional allowances were established, including those based on competence and working years at ANRA. As a result of these changes, the salaries of ANRA's staff from the mentioned technical departments have significantly increased.

ANRA hopes that these changes will prevent the outflow of specialists from the organization, as well as will contribute to the recruitment of new specialists.

Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) also requires its own technical support organization-"Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center" LLC (hereinafter referred to as NRSC) to carry out its designated functions.

Therefore, in addition to the specialists being trained for the regulatory authority, personnel must also be prepared for the technical support organization, which is estimated to require approximately 50 new specialists.

The Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the "Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center" LLC actively participate in training courses and workshops organized by international organizations, especially by the IAEA.

At the request of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the "Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center" LLC is developing new "basic" retraining courses to ensure the rapid training of new specialists. The progress of the completed and ongoing activities indicates that the challenge has not been fully resolved, but it is currently under "manageable" control.

Challenge 4: Regulatory preparedness for potential introduction of new technologies (e.g. SMRs)

Within the framework of international cooperation of ANRA and NRSC, the following activities are being carried out:

- 1. US NRC experience of licensing of construction of NPPs was reviewed. Recommendations on changes in the relevant licensing procedures were suggested
- 2. New revision of atomic Law was developed among others addressing SMR related issues

ANRA uses its TSO, i.e. the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), for research activities:

- Analysis of the licensing procedures on the site selection and NPP construction;
- Estimation of the size of the emergency response zone for the ANPP site in case of deployment of NuScale SMR as well as calculation of the isotopic composition of the NuScale SMR core and source term
- Investigation of the NUSCALE power plant seismic design suitability for the ANPP new unit seismic environment
- Analysis of the peculiarities of the Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) assemblies;

ANRA is analyzing the licensing procedures for all life-cycle stages of a nuclear facility, as well as the requirements for safety justification documents, taking into account the specific features of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).

The progress of the completed and ongoing activities indicates that the challenge has not been fully resolved, but it is currently under "manageable" control.

Common issues, as defined during the joint 8th and 9th Joint Review Meeting

Managing extraordinary circumstances impacting the safe operation of nuclear installations;

In recent years, the Republic of Armenia has faced extraordinary circumstances, including the declaration of a state of emergency due to Covid-19 in 2019–2020, and the declaration of martial law in 2020.

The above-mentioned events prompted the Government of the Republic of Armenia to review the conditions and implications related to the declaration of a state of emergency and martial law, including associated restrictions and legal relationships. Institutions of critical importance to the state (including ANPP and ANRA) were granted powers based on the principle of exception — for example, an exemption from participating in conscription and mobilization.

ANRA's Emergency Response Center (ERC) was activated, and the emergency instructions were reviewed by ANRA. New calculations were carried out to assess the radiological consequences in the event of missile attacks on the plant, such scenarios were also included in the emergency instructions. The strengthening of the ANRA's Emergency Response Center's security protection and the establishment of a backup Emergency Response Center were prioritized.

ANRA now plans to locate the Emergency Response Center in a missile-protected area, equipped with rest rooms and stocked with essential supplies for primary use (including food), ensuring uninterrupted operation of the center for 2-3 days.

"The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) is constructing a backup emergency center outside the ANPP site, the construction of which is expected to be completed in 2026."

Strengthening national regulatory capabilities taking into account new and innovative technologies

ANRA and NRSC are conducting a number of studies aimed at enhancing the professional skills and experience of their staff, as well as, when necessary, acquiring new computational tools and providing corresponding training. Specifically, ANRA and NRSC have carried out:

- 1. Development of the capabilities of deterministic safety analysis of SMRs. Currently neutronic model of one of the prominent SMR designs is under development at the NRSC.
- 2. Preliminary design safety assessment exercise for 3 SMR designs was conducted

3. Preliminary site suitability analysis was carried for one of the SMR designs for current ANPP site.

ANRA uses its TSO, i.e. the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), for research activities:

- Analysis of the licensing procedures on the site selection and NPP construction;
- Estimation of the size of the emergency response zone for the ANPP site in case of deployment of NuScale SMR as well as calculation of the isotopic composition of the NuScale SMR core and source term
- Investigation of the NuScale power plant seismic design suitability for the ANPP new unit seismic environment
- Analysis of the peculiarities of the Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) assemblies.

ANRA is analyzing the licensing procedures for all life-cycle stages of a nuclear facility, as well as the requirements for safety justification documents, taking into account the specific features of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).

Fostering international collaboration

The Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority as a member state of the IAEA, a WENRA observer, and a member of the Council of Regulatory Bodies for the Safe Use of Atomic Energy of the CIS participating states as well as Member of the Commission on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy of the CIS participating states, actively participates in the activities of the aforementioned bodies. In order to foster international collaboration, ANRA cooperates with the international organizations and regulatory authorities of other countries.

ANRA is also expanding bilateral cooperation between regulatory bodies of both neighboring and other countries.

ANRA has cooperation agreements with the following regulatory authorities:

- United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) in frame of the Arrangement between the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters. The arrangement was signed on 15 March 2017. The new arrangement was signed on 15 March 2023.
- In 2024, the nuclear regulatory authorities of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on the content of the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety issues. In order to obtain a position on the advisability of signing the Memorandum, it was submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it is still in the process of being agreed upon.
- In 2024 the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the Radiation Inspection and Control Service of the Department of Labour Inspection, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance of the Republic of Cyprus agreed on the content of the Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in the fields of regulatory control on the safe use of nuclear energy, sources of ionizing radiation, emergency response and preparedness, management of radioactive waste and transportation of radioactive material and their related activities. The MOU is in the process of interstate agreement.
- In 2025 Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority agreed
 on the content of the Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in the fields of regulatory control
 on the safe use of nuclear energy, sources of ionizing radiation and their related activities. The MOU
 is in the process of interstate agreement.

In frame of EC INSC, IAEA technical cooperation projects ANRA cooperates with:

- Bel V, (a subsidiary of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control), Belgium;
- Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA), Bulgaria;
- Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), Germany;
- Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France;
- Nuclear Research Institute Řež plc (NRI Řež), Czech Republic;
- Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland (STUK);
- Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority (UJD SR);
- State Office for Nuclear Safety (SUJB), Czech Republic.
- Sweden Nuclear Regulatory Authority (SMM).
- And other.

Foster international peer review missions and timely addressing of findings;

SALTO Follow-up Mission

The ANPP has received numerous peer review missions from WANO and the IAEA. The most recent were the WANO mission from August 25 to 29, 2025.

The IAEA will conduct a Safety Aspects of Long-Term Operation (SALTO) follow-up mission at the Armenian NPP Unit №2 from 06 to 10 October 2025. The SALTO follow-up mission will review the progress in addressing each issue of the from the 2021 SALTO mission.

The EC Peer Review of the Implementation of Armenia's National Action Plan is planning to conduct in the end of 2025. The main objective of the NAcP peer review is to provide an international, complementary assessment of the implementation of the NAcP. This will enhance safety in a consistent way by providing the licensee and the national regulator with new insights on the need for improvements. The peer review will focus on the progress of implementation of the NAcP and the peer review team will issue a NAcP Peer Review Report focusing on: the current progress; actions that need to be followed up and finished; and possibly new actions that need to be undertaken.

Possible impact of global climate changes on the safe operation of nuclear installations;

In 2021, assessments were conducted to evaluate the adequacy of the list of external hazards compiled within the framework of the External Events PSA. At the same time, the adequacy assessment was carried out taking into account the recommendations of EU experts on the stress test report and the recommendations of the 2014 IPSART mission regarding the External Events PSA report, with amendments made to the list of external hazards as necessary based on the recommendations of the aforementioned missions.

The following steps were taken in selecting the external hazard factors:

- Review of the list of external events based on the results of the current analysis,
- Consideration of the IPSART mission's recommendations regarding the current External Events PSA,
- Consideration of the EU experts' recommendations on the stress test report,
- Identification of a new list of external events, taking into account the results of the abovementioned steps,

• Identification of the list of external events for which hazard curves must be developed, taking into account updated meteorological data.

Based on the results of the work, external hazards were identified for which hazard curves were developed, taking into account the updated meteorological data.

Based on statistical data, exceedance probabilities were calculated for extreme weather conditions: 0.001 (100,000 years), 0.01 (10,000 years), 0.1 (1,000 years), 1 (100 years), 2 (50 years), 5 (20 years), 10 (10 years), and 20 (5 years).

Securing reliable supply chains

In recent years, the timely supply of equipment for the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) has faced additional difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of war in both Armenia and Ukraine. To address this issue, the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) signed additional contracts with potential supplier organizations, which ensured the security of equipment and service supply chains, including under conditions of military conflicts. For example, in 2024, a supply of spare parts for the major overhaul of the diesel generator was organized from Ukraine.

Strategies for ageing management in support of the operation of nuclear installations

As part of the measures on the extension of the service life of Armenian NPP Unit 2, strength calculations of SSCs were developed which required justification of the residual life until 2026. These calculations are defined as TLAA. In the process of implementation of measures on the re-extension of the service life of the ANPP Unit 2 for the next 10 years, the process of revalidation of strength calculations is considered.

A calculation for brittle fracture resistance of the Armenian NPP Unit 2 RPV was performed, taking into account the recovery annealing of the metal of weld joint No4 within the period of outage in 2021, which demonstrated that the brittle fracture resistance criteria for the reactor pressure vessel are met until the end of 51 refueling campaigns (2039).

Ageing Management Program developed by the ANPP on the basis of the regulatory requirements and IAEA recommendations taking into account the nine attributes of an effective ageing management program.

- Program on Ageing management of the pressurizer
- Program on Ageing management of the ANPP pumps of the 2nd and 3rd safety classes
- Program on Ageing management of the ANPP hydraulic engineering installations
- Program on Ageing management of the ANPP cables
- Program on Ageing management of the ANPP Unit 2 diesel-generator station (mechanical part)
- Program Ageing management of the ANPP Unit 2 reactor control and protection system equipment
- Program on Ageing management of the Reactor Coolant Pumps
- Program on Ageing management of the Reactor Coolant Pipelines
- Program on Ageing management of the Main Gate Valves
- Program on Ageing management of the Steam Generators
- Program on Ageing management of the Stainless Steel Heat Exchangers
- Program on Ageing management of the Stress Corrosion Cracking

Ageing Management Program developed by the ANPP on the basis of the regulatory requirements and IAEA recommendations taking into account the nine attributes of an effective ageing management program connected with obsolescence are:

- Program on Ageing management of obsolescence
- Program on Ageing management of cables
- Program on Ageing management of I&C components
- Program on Ageing management of spare parts of the components and equipment

In 2017 ANRA issued new regulatory requirements to the equipment qualification for harsh environmental conditions.

ANPP and "Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center" CJSC developed new **Program of «Equipment Qualification for Harsh Environmental Conditions»** approved by the ANPP.

The activities have been planned to implement the program with the support of the external dedicated organizations. Implementation of certain measures included in the program is supported under the IAEA technical cooperation projects.

Strengthening emergency preparedness and response arrangements and fostering cross border collaboration

For strengthening emergency preparedness and response arrangements and fostering cross border collaboration

- In 2024, the nuclear regulatory authorities of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on the content of the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety issues. In order to obtain a position on the advisability of signing the Memorandum, it was submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it is still in the process of being agreed upon
- In 2024 the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the Radiation Inspection and Control Service of the Department of Labour Inspection, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance of the Republic of Cyprus agreed on the content of the Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in the fields of regulatory control on the safe use of nuclear energy, sources of ionizing radiation, emergency response and preparedness, management of radioactive waste and transportation of radioactive material and their related activities. The MOU is still in the process interstate agreement.

Within the framework of the Commission on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy of the CIS participating states, the following agreements have been developed, and the Republic of Armenia is a party to them:

 Agreement of the CIS participating states on cooperation in the exchange of radiation monitoring data.

Within the framework of this agreement, the Plan of Activities for the Implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation between CIS Participating States in the Exchange of Radiation Monitoring Data has been developed.

 Agreement on cooperation between CIS participating states to ensure preparedness in case of a nuclear accident or radiation emergency, and mutual assistance in the elimination of their consequences.

Within the framework of this agreement, a protocol has been developed regarding practical measures for notification of nuclear or radiation emergencies, as well as the scope and content of assistance.

A Regulation on mutual assistance between CIS participating states in the event of a nuclear accident or radiation emergency and the elimination of their consequences has been developed.

Standard symptom-oriented scenarios of nuclear accidents or radiation emergency situations have been developed to determine the level of danger and the scope of mutual assistance required for their mitigation.

Standard procedures have been developed.

1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.1 EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Article 6. Existing Nuclear Installations

Each contracting party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations at the time the Convention enters into force for that contracting party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in respect to the Convention, the contracting party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are urgently made to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be outlined to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shutdown may take into account the general situation in energy production and potential alternatives, as well as the social, environmental and economic consequences.

There is only one nuclear installation in the RA covered under the Convention on Nuclear Safety -Armenian NPP. The construction of the Armenian NPP was started in 1969. The Armenian NPP design is based on the first generation of V-230 reactor and takes into account the seismic specifics of the plant site. Armenian NPP consists of two WWER-440 type units, designated as version V-270. The Unit № 1 was commissioned in December 1976, and the Unit №2 - in January 1980. The installed capacity of each unit was 407, 5 MW, after the modifications on Unit 2 installed capacity is 451MW, and the design lifetime is 30 years. The Armenian NPP was shutdown shortly after the Spitak earthquake on December 7, 1988, with its epicenter located 80 km north of the NPP site. Though the NPP did not suffer any damage, and both units remained in operation, the USSR Board of Ministers adopted decree to shutdown the Armenian NPP. Thus, the Unit №1 was shutdown on February 25, 1989 and the Unit №2 - on March 18, 1989. Both units were in the long-term shutdown condition, but not decommissioned. To overcome the energy crisis on April 07, 1993 the RA Government adopted a decree to restart the Armenian NPP Unit №2. Before and after the Armenian NPP Unit №2 restart, several hundred safety upgrades were developed and implemented and are continuously implemented in accordance with the RA Government Decree № 474 as of October 05, 1994 on approval of the Concept for the Armenian NPP Restart and the List of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 safety improvement measures, which is periodically revised and updated taking into account the operation experience of Armenian NPP and of other countries operating similar NPPs, new IAEA safety standards, recommendations and suggestions made by the expert and peer review missions organized in frame of the international and technical cooperation projects with the IAEA, EC and other countries and international organizations.

The following safety related measures have been implemented in the reporting period covering 2022-2025:

- Modification of the spray system of Armenian NPP Unit №2;
- Improvement of leak tightness of the confinement Armenian NPP Unit №2.

The following safety related measures are in the process of implementation:

- Modernization of the air conditioning system of boric unit of Armenian NPP Unit №2 (will be completed during the outage in 2025);
- Replacement of pipelines of the essential consumers cooling system inside the reactor building and boric unit (will be completed during the outage in 2025-2026);
- Modification of Deep evaporation facility (DEF-200).

By the Government Decree N1597-A of the RA as of September 14, 2023, "Program for the Extension of the Lifetime of Power Unit No.2 (LTE-2) of the "Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint-Stock Company" and "Plan for the Organization and Implementation of the Measures Provided by the LTE-2 Program for Power Unit No.2 of the "Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint-Stock Company" were approved.

The licensing plan of the Armenian NPP second lifetime extension has been established following the Government Decree № 1085-N as of August 23, 2012 on approval of the requirements to design lifetime extension for the Armenian NPP Unit №2 operation.

The following safety related measures covered in the licensing plan are in process of implementation:

- Replacement of elements of safety classes 1-3, the residual life time of which is close to exhaustion and not subject to restoration (valves, fans, electric motors, cables, electrical devices, control and measuring instruments, etc.);
- Continuing the improvement of leak tightness of the confinement Armenian NPP Unit №2;
- Implementation of technical measures to establish LOCA-200 in any place of the MCP as design basis accident;
- Carrying out probabilistic analysis of destruction (PAD) of the reactor vessel and steam generator collectors;
- Justification of the applicability of the LBB concept in connection with the performed modification of the ECCS and taking into account the upcoming modification of the ECCS as well;
- Expansion of the Leak detection system (LDS) system based on the results of the revision of the LBB concept;
- The implementation of fire safety measures (carried out based on the analysis of impact of fires on the safe shutdown and cooling of the reactor, control and localization of radioactive releases in the environment);
- Implementation of the program for monitoring the properties of the metal of the reactor vessel of Unit 2 of the ANPP after annealing performed in 2021 (Reactor vessel surveillance program);
- Construction and commissioning of the radioactive waste processing complex;
- Construction of a new storage facility for storing conditioned radioactive waste;
- Construction of an industrial complex for the production of protective non-returnable container taking into account the amount of accumulated radioactive waste from operation of the Unit 2 of ANPP until 2036;
 - Implementation of the seismic safety assessment program for earthquakes with PGA=0.42g;
 - Upgrade of the upper-level reactor protection system according to technological parameters with the replacement of the relay circuit with a microprocessor one;
 - Replacement of the RCR drive;
 - Upgrade of the Reactor Circulation Pump automation system with the replacement of the relay circuit with a microprocessor one;

- Upgrade of the technical signaling of the MCR and the Emergency Shutdown Panel and Post Accident Monitoring System (ESP & PAMS);
- Upgrade of the event recording system;
- Replacement of the vibration monitoring system of TG-3.4;
- Implementation of the vibration monitoring system of 2RCP-1÷6;
- Implementation of the emergency gas removal system from under the reactor cap;
- Upgrade of the Automatic Power Regulator (APR) system;
- Upgrade of the Neutron Flux Control Equipment (NFCE) system;
- Modernization of the level control system in 2SG-1-6;
- Replacement of primary converters and secondary instrumentation at the Emergency Shutdown Panel and Post Accident Monitoring System(ESP & PAMS);
- Modernization of the fuel loading machine (electrical part);
- Modernization of the relay circuit of the generator-transformer unit TG-3, TG-4, T-3, T-4 and natural needs transformers 23T and 24T with replacement with a microprocessor in a two-channel is carried out;
- Replacement of 6 kV switches with gas-insulated ones together with relay compartments using microprocessor devices in buses 3RB-1.2; 4RB-1.2;
- Replacement of 0.4 kV circuit breakers together with relay compartments using microprocessor devices on buses 25BNN, 26BNN, 28NA, 29NA;
- Replacement of a three-pole low-oil 35 kV circuit breaker of a 2Tr transformer with an outdoor SF6 circuit breaker;
- Replacement of emergency lighting panels with modern ones;
- Modernization of the Auxiliary Emergency Cooling (AEC) system in terms of replacing sections of the outdoor unit 6 kV and the complete transformer substation 0.4 kV;
- Protection of the containment to prevent the accumulation of explosive concentrations of the hydrogen during severe accidents;
- Implementation of the new design of the RCP oil system;
- Provision of the signal to close the ventilation system dampers based on the pressure in the subcap space;
- Implementation of the equipment qualification program at the ANPP;
- Implementation of independent habitability systems of emergency stop panel (ESP);
- Design, acquisition, construction, installation, connection and commissioning of a new diesel generator station;
- Justification of the operability of the SG SDP system for 24 hours, taking into account the diesel fuel reserves, reserves of chemically demineralized water and long-term operation of the pump;
- The probability of a threat of an explosive shock wave, the fall of aircraft and other flying objects. Calculation of the stability of the protective structures of localizing systems to impact loads;
- Refinement and implementation of the SBEOP kit taking into account the modification of the ECCS and sprinkler system;
- Updating and equipping the emergency response center;
- Inspecting the existing cladding in rooms with liquid radioactive waste tanks to determine the degree of tightness;
- Performing a calculation justification for the integrity and operability of equipment used in severe accident management;

• Revision and implementation of the SAMG taking into account the upgrades performed at the ANPP.

2 ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Article 7. Legislative and Regulatory Framework

- 1. Each contracting party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.
- 2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
 - (i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;
 - (ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a licence;
 - (iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licences;
 - (iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences, including suspension, modification or revocation.

2.1 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on December 6, 2015. The amendments to the constitution put the country on a course from having a semi-presidential system to being a parliamentary government.

The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement entered into force in 01.03.2021. The roadmap has been developed to harmonize the national legislation with the EU directives. ANRA has undertaken responsibility to bring the legal regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety in conformity with 5 EU directives (Annex 3).

The Constitution of the RA has the highest legal force and its provisions are directly applied.

Laws that should comply with the constitutional laws belong to the first level of legislative framework on the nuclear safety regulation.

Decrees of the RA Government and the RA Prime Minister belong to the second level of the legislative framework.

Regulations approved by the ANRA Chairman, registered by the Ministry of Justice of the RA and named "subordinate acts" belong to the third level of the legislative framework.

Guides, methodologies, industrial standards and others belong to the forth level of the legislative framework.

The intentional treaties of the RA are integral part of the legislative framework and also belong to the first level. If the international treaties ratified by the National Assembly of the RA stipulate provisions other than the ones stipulated in the laws, the provisions of the ratified international treaties are applied. The list of international treaties ratified by the RA is provided in Annex 1.

2.2 NATIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND REGULATIONS

The following laws directly pertain to the nuclear safety and belong to the first level of the legislative framework:

- The Code of the RA on Administrative Offenses, as amended in 1996. The amendments empower ANRA to impose sanctions (warnings and fines) to offender of the legislation in the field of atomic energy utilization;
- The Law of the RA on Environmental Impact Assessment and Expertise as of June 21, 2014 (last amendments as of 03 May 2023);
- The Law of the RA on Population Protection in Emergencies (№ N-265 as of December 09, 1998) that establishes organization of population protection in emergency situations, rights and responsibilities of the state and local authorities, entities, officials and citizens involved in the national emergency response system;
- The Law of the RA on organization and conduct of inspections (№ HO-172 as of May 17, 2000) that settles relations concerned with organization and conduct of inspections and examinations of practices of entities as well as of individual entrepreneurs;
- The Law of the RA on Licensing (№ HO-193 as of May 30, 2001) that establishes types of practices subject to licensing in the atomic energy utilization field and settles relations related to licensing;
- The Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (№ HO-285 as of March 1, 1999), which is the basic legal document for settling relations in the field of the atomic energy utilization and is called to ensure fulfillment of obligations of the RA under the international treaties in the field of atomic energy utilization;
- The Criminal Code of the RA (№ HO-199-N as of May 5, 2021) entered into force on July 1, 2022. The Code specifies the types of crimes and liabilities in the field of atomic energy utilization.

Decrees of the RA Government and the Prime Minister belonging to the second level of the legislative framework settle down specific relations.

The complete list of the legal acts (laws, legal acts, subordinate acts) enforced in the RA in the atomic energy utilization field is provided in Annex 2.

Legal acts, that are approved by ANRA and registered by the Ministry of Justice of the RA (and that are binding), are adopted in accordance with the legal acts having higher legal force. These legal acts belong to the third level of the legislative framework, are named subordinate acts and settle down specific issues.

The relations concerned with development, agreement and approval of legal acts are settled down in the Law of the RA on Normative Legal Acts. Thus, in accordance with the procedure established, a draft legal act developed by ANRA prior to submission to the RA Government for adoption (in case of laws for approval) should be submitted to the concerned authorities (ministries, state authorities under the RA Government) for consent and posed on the ANRA web site.

In accordance with the Law of the RA on Normative Legal Acts the following documents should be submitted in support to a draft legal act:

- Justification for adoption of legal act;
- Drafts legal acts concerned with adoption of legal act or a note on absence a need to adopt them;
- A note on changes in the state budget concerned with adoption of legal act.

The ministries and state authorities make their comments and proposals to submitted draft legal acts. Based on these comments and proposals ANRA makes corrections and adjustments to draft legal act, as

necessary, and submits it to the RA Government. If the concerned ministries and state authorities make comments and proposals, ANRA submits a note with justification of accepted comments and proposals as well as justification on the reasons for non-acceptance of proposals or comments made.

The same procedure is applied also to the process of amendment or supplement of the adopted legal acts.

The following legal acts were adopted in the reporting period

Laws

The Law of the RA on «Environmental impact assessment and expertise» has been amended on May 03, 2023.

Decrees of RA Government/Prime Minister

In the reporting period the government also approved a decree № 326-N in 2024 on approval of the characteristics to be considered during the assessment and expertise of the environmental impact of facilities important from the point of view of nuclear energy safety.

RA Government approved a decree № 393-A in 23.03.2023 on initiating the process to extend the operational period of unit N 2 of the "Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint Stock company (Life Time Extension-2)

RA Government approved a decree № 1597-A in 14.09.2023 on approval of the program for extension of the operation period of the N-2 power unit of the "Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint Stock company (LTE-2) and the plan for organization and implementation of measures provided for by the program for extension of the operation period of the N-2 power unit of the "Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint Stock company (LTE-2)

RA Government approved a decree № 197-N in 08.02.2024 on amendments to the decision № 737 of July 3, 2014 of the government of the Republic of Armenia, made certain changes to the ANRA structure of ANRA. The specialists with the appropriate qualifications from the ANRA's Nuclear Safety and Radiation Safety Departments from civil servant's status have become civil contractors, starting from 2025.

2.3 SYSTEM OF LICENSING

The licensing related relations are settled down under the Law of the RA on Licensing, the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes and the relevant licensing procedures approved by the RA Government.

The following practices in atomic energy utilization field are subject to licensing:

- Site selection, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear installations;
- Use, transport and storage of nuclear materials and radioactive materials;
- Physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials;
- Expertise of designs and other documents of nuclear installations;
- Physical persons implementing practices and holding positions important to safety in the atomic energy field and other.

For instance, the RA Government Decree № 400-N as of 24.03.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure for operation of nuclear installations specifies the requirements to licensing operation of nuclear installations, the list of application supporting documents, the requirements mandatory for obtaining a license, the provisions related to review of application and its supporting documents, rejection of license application and other issues.

In accordance with the established procedure ANRA reviews application for obtaining license for construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations within 30 days after receiving all documents stipulated in the law, and grants or rejects license within 180 days after all documents are submitted. The Law of the RA on Licensing specifies also provisions for extension of license validity period.

Thus, ANRA establishes a licensing commission to make conclusions on granting, termination or revocation of license; the statute of the licensing commission is approved by ANRA. The licensing commission organizes sessions to review license applications. Applicant is duly notified about review not later that in 7 days in advance with indication of venue (address) where review takes place, date and time. Non-participation of applicant in review is not the basis for non-review or rejection of license application if other date for review is requested by applicant. This request of applicant can be met if he cannot participate in the review by reasoned justifications and if postponement of review will not result in violation of terms specified in the legislation. Applicant has the right to involve specialist, expert, auditor, lawyer or interpreter in the review. Applicant or his counselors have right to make speeches, answer questions posed by the commission members, request arbitration. Reviews are conducted with open doors. Reviews involving state, official and banking confidential information are conducted with the closed doors. At applicant's request, reviews can be conducted with the closed doors if commercial confidential information will be discussed during review. Journalists, specialists, officials and other persons can be involved in the reviews conducted with the closed doors. The closed-door review process can be audio and video recorded.

Provisions related to the public involvement and awareness of nuclear installation construction are specified in the Law of the RA on Environmental Impact Assessment and Expertise (Articles 4,5), the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (Article 10) and the Law of the RA on Construction of New NPP Unit (s) (Article 4). According to the latter, in the process of new NPP unit(s) construction the RA Government in the established order shall, regularly but not later than once in a half a year, inform public and environmental organizations about the progress with implementation of the program on construction of new NPP unit(s).

In accordance with the Law of the RA on Construction of New NPP Unit(s), the RA Government under its Decree № 604-N as of 20 May 2010 on provision of information on implementation of the program on construction of new NPP unit(s) to public and environmental organizations, has established that with the purpose to provide information on implementation the program on construction of new NPP unit(s) the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure shall cooperate with environmental organizations, as well as mass media in compliance with the Law of the RA on Freedom of Information.

The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure makes public the information on the progress of new NPP unit(s) construction through mass media sources, internet, and other means specified in the RA legislation. In particular, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure:

- Not later than once in each six months, through press reports or press releases informs public and environmental organizations about the progress with implementation of new NPP unit(s) construction program;
- As necessary, organizes press conferences as well as meetings of journalists and representatives of environmental organizations with persons involved in new NPP unit(s) construction program;

- In two days before a press conference makes relevant announcements to mass media and environmental organizations that are accredited in advance to participate in the press conference. Announcement about press conference should be posted on the web site of the ministry. The announcement can be disseminated also via newspapers and e-mailed to mass media and environmental organizations;
- As necessary, requests the persons responsible for new NPP unit(s) construction process to prepare publications and expert analysis related to the program;
- During presentations organized on different stages of new NPP(s) construction program, as necessary, organizes visit of journalists and environmental organizations to the new NPP unit site and provides also with press releases and transportation.

In accordance with the Code of the RA on Administrative Offences a legal entity has no right to implement practices subject to licensing without licence, otherwise administrative or criminal liabilities shall be applied. In accordance with the Article 169 of the Code of the RA on Administrative Offences, the implementation of a practice without licence is subject to a fine at the rates specified in the legislation. The Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the RA stipulates the provisions related to implementation of activities without special permit (licence), causing losses to public or commercial organizations and other as well as enforcement actions to be imposed for each offence.

The right of ANRA to impose enforcement actions is established in the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, the Law of the RA on Licensing and the Code of the RA on Administrative Offences.

2.4 SYSTEM OF REGULATORY INSPECTION AND ASSESSMENT

The inspection is one of the major functions of ANRA to satisfy itself that Armenian NPP fulfills the terms and conditions set out in the authorizations and the regulatory requirements. ANRA's inspections are organized and conducted in accordance with the Law on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, ANRA Statute and the Instruction on organization and conduct of inspections at the NPP.

The inspections are performed in accordance with the schedule approved in frame of ANRA's annual plan on preliminarily determined topics. It is based on the periodic inspection program developed by ANRA.

ANRA performs the following inspections at Armenian NPP in accordance with its periodic inspection plan:

- Implementation of the requirements of safety rules and regulations in the nuclear energy field;
- Implementation of the license terms and conditions;
- Implementation of QA programs;
- Implementation of ANRA's requirements;
- Organizational structure of NPP;
- Implementation of NPP safety upgrades, modifications of systems and elements important to NPP safety;
- Implementation of periodical examinations of systems and elements important to NPP safety;
- Ageing management system of elements and systems important to NPP safety;

- Technical examination/surveillance;
- Organization of maintenance and repair of elements and systems important to NPP safety;
- Personnel training system;
- Technical and operational documentation system;
- Implementation of the requirements of the technological specifications and instructions on NPP operation;
- Radiation safety and environmental control;
- NPP emergency preparedness;
- Radioactive waste management;
- Fresh and spent nuclear fuel management;
- Nuclear materials accounting system;
- Civil structures;
- Physical protection system;
- Organization of housekeeping;
- System on investigation of NPP event causes;
- Fire protection system.

The inspection of the implementation of design lifetime extension measures at the Armenian NPP are also included in ANRA's inspection plan.

In accordance with the chapter 2 point 7 of the Procedure on conduct of inspections, ANRA undertakes planned and reactive inspections at the Armenian NPP that in its turn can be announced and unannounced.

Planned inspections are performed in accordance with ANRA's work plan. Reactive inspections are performed in connection with accidents and events at the NPP or in accordance with decision of ANRA management.

In case of announced inspections the operating organization is notified by ANRA not later than in 10 days before inspection. Unannounced inspections are performed without advance notification of the operating organization.

The regulatory inspectors use the following methods of inspections:

- Monitoring and direct observation;
- Discussions and interviews with personnel;
- Review and verification of instructions, procedures, records and other documents on ensuring and justification of safety.

The inspection team collects the following information prior to an inspection:

- Safety norms and rules related to the inspected area;
- Documents related to the organizational structure of the operating organization, quality assurance program for practices implemented by the NPP and related to the inspected area and relevant operational procedures and programmes;
- Terms and conditions of licenses/permits issued by ANRA to the operating organization;

- Information from annual reports and/or safety submittals;
- Information on enforcement actions imposed by ANRA earlier and information on their implementation, and also reporting documents developed based on results of earlier performed inspections;
- Other available information related to the inspection.

Deficiencies detected during inspections are recorded and discussed at the final meeting with the management and responsible staff of the NPP.

In accordance with the chapter 5 of the Procedure on conduct of inspection, results are documented in act (report) if no non-compliance has been detected or act-enforcement if non-compliances have been detected with indication of necessary corrective measures and deadlines. The following information is indicated in the act-enforcement:

- Fact of non-compliance with the safety requirement;
- Points of articles with indication of legal acts, norms and rules in atomic energy utilization field non-complied with;
- Requirements to eliminate deficiency detected;
- Deadline for elimination of deficiency.

Act and act-enforcement are signed by the leader of inspection team, all members of the inspection team and transmitted for signature to the NPP Director.

The resident inspector conducts routine inspections. When detecting non-compliances with the NPP safety requirements the resident inspector issues enforcement to the NPP Director and informs ANRA about it.

ANRA controls over fulfillment of its act-enforcements and enforcements through:

- Receiving and reviewing information on fulfillment of requirements of act-enforcements and enforcements and control over timeliness of its submission;
- Verification of fulfillment of act-enforcements and enforcements.

ANRA performs accounting and control over implementation of the enforcement actions applied.

The "Inspection" process of ANRA QMS has been supplemented with a paragraph describing a mechanism for using feedback from inspections as input for improving the effectiveness of the regulatory processes.

ANRA has implemented a database of inspections (Inspection module), where the conducted inspections and identified findings are collected.

ANRA is currently revising the document on the "Procedure for organization and conduct of inspections at nuclear energy facilities". The goal of developing the new procedure is to have a systematic guide for conducting inspections at nuclear energy facilities, which will include the types of inspections, the facilities that are subject to inspection, inspection planning, organization, implementation, summary of results, application of liability measures, evaluation of effectiveness, and inspection database. The new guidance is being developed in accordance with the provisions of the IAEA GSG-13 document, while taking into account the recommendations and advice of the IAEA IRRS mission.

2.5 ENFORCEMENT OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND TERMS OF LICENCES

The right of ANRA to impose enforcement actions is established in the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, the Law of the RA on Licensing and the Code of the RA on Administrative Offences.

The Articles 36 and 37 of the Law of the RA on Licensing specify the cases for suspension and termination when ANRA has right to suspend and terminate license.

The Code of the RA on Administrative Offences (Articles 97-97⁶) specifies the types of administrative offences in the atomic energy utilization field and the types of enforcement actions (fines) applied by ANRA.

The process of application of enforcement actions starts with drawing up a protocol on administrative offence. The protocol should indicate date and venue, name and surname of person drawing up the protocol, information about person committed an offence, time and venue where the offence was committed, subject-matter of offence, the normative document which establishes liability for the present offence, explanatory note of the offender, other information related to the case. The protocol is signed by the person drawn up the protocol and by the person committed the offence (offender). If the offender refuses to sign the protocol, the indication on that should be appropriately made. The offender has right to give explanations and comments to the protocol content which are to be attached to the protocol, as well as to express in writing reasons of his refusal to sign the protocol. While drawing a protocol the offender is notified of his rights and responsibilities and this is relevantly indicated in the protocol. The protocol is the basis for investigation of a case with offence. Authority (official) investigating the case when detecting causes and conditions resulting in administrative offence, makes relevant proposals on undertaking measures intended to eliminate those causes and conditions.

Having investigated the case on administrative offences the official makes one of the following decisions:

- Impose administrative penalty;
- Withdraw the case.

Decision on administrative offence is mandatory for implementation by state and public authorities, entities, officials and citizens. Decision on the case on administrative offence can be appealed in court by person to whom it was applied as well as by aggrieved party.

In the reporting period 23 administrative offences (fines) were applied to the Armenian NPP management.

Thus, the RA has established and maintains the legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear installations safety that includes:

- Establishment of relevant national requirements and regulations on safety;
- System for licensing of nuclear installations and prohibiting to operate nuclear installations without licence;
- System of regulatory inspections and assessment to confirm the compliance with the requirements specified in the regulations and licence terms;
- Enforcement of requirements specified in the applied regulations and licence terms, including suspension, modification and termination of licence.

As mentioned in the point 2.4 of this report, it is planned to include a section on the application of measures of responsibility in the newly developed inspection procedures. In particular, it is planned to include violations subject to the application of measures of responsibility, means of responsibility and decisions on the application of measures of responsibility.

3 REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Article 8. Regulatory Body

- 1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.
- 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

3.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REGULATORY BODY

ANRA was established under the RA Government Decree № 573 as of November 16, 1993 as a state authority under the RA Government empowered to regulate the nuclear and radiation safety in the atomic energy utilization field. In the period 2002-2008 ANRA functioned within the Ministry for Nature Protection of the RA in the status of the inspectorate; in May 2008 under the Ordinance issued by the RA President the inspectorate was reorganized into the State Committee under the Government of the RA on Nuclear Safety Regulation (it was decided to retain the acronym "ANRA"). The statute and the organizational chart of ANRA were approved under the RA Government Decree № 866 as of June 17, 2008. A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on December 6, 2015. The amendments to the constitution put the country on a course from having a semi-presidential system to being a parliamentary republic. After the new elections in December 2018, the decision was made to reduce the number of ministries. On May 8, 2019, the RA Law on Amendments and Supplements to the RA Law on "The Structure and Functioning of the Government" (LO-31-N) was adopted, with twelve ministries included in the structure of the government instead of seventeen.

The status of ANRA within the government structure has not been changed and it remains reporting to the Government and the Prime Minister and its statute was approved on July 11, 2018 under the Prime Minister Decree №747-L. The change in the RA Government structure did not affect ANRA's implementation of its statutory and regulatory functions. ANRA's position within the RA Government Structure is provided in Annex 4.

ANRA is an authority subordinated to the RA Government, implementing the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety in the atomic energy utilization field. ANRA Chairman is appointed and dismissed by the RA Prime Minister. ANRA Chairman reports to the RA Government and RA Prime Minister. ANRA does not report to any other authority or ministry. ANRA is independent from the agencies responsible for promotion of nuclear energy, has its independent budget (ANRA is directly financed from the state budget); ANRA's jurisdictions are established in the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (Articles 17, 17¹) and its Statute.

In accordance with the above mentioned legal acts ANRA's jurisdictions are:

- a. Development and submission of drafts of normative legal acts related to the atomic energy utilization field to the RA Prime Minister:
- b. Licensing of practices and physical persons implementing practices and holding positions important in terms of safety in the atomic energy utilization field;
- c. Suspension or termination of license in accordance with the requirements of the international treaties and the RA legislation;

- d. Safety assessment, organization and conduct of expertise of practices, installations and equipment in the atomic energy utilization field;
- e. Organization and conduct of researches in the atomic energy utilization field for safety improvement purposes;
- f. Assessment of investigation of nuclear and radiological incidents that occurred during operation of nuclear installations made by the operating organization and, if necessary, conducts additional investigation and develops a database of violations;
- g. Control over compliance with requirements of RA laws related to the atomic energy utilization field as well as terms and conditions of issued licenses by legal entities and physical persons, verification of quality assurance programs of contractors providing services and performing activities important in terms of safety for licensees;
- h. In accordance with the RA legislation, imposing administrative offences to licensees breaching the RA laws related to the atomic energy utilization field, safety norms and rules, requirements of sanctions imposed, and in the order established in the law, transmission of the materials related to breach to the law enforcement authorities:
- i. Imposing sanctions to licensees binding for implementation when non-compliance with requirements specified in the RA legislation related to the atomic energy utilization field and with terms and conditions of issued licenses is detected and issuing order for termination of activities being implemented in case of threat to the human health and the environment. The right to stop immediately Armenian NPP operation rests with the Chairman, his relevant deputy and the site inspector,
- j. Once a year submitting a report to the RA Government on nuclear and radiation safety at the nuclear installations important to safety,
- k. Providing information to state and local authorities, entities and mass media on nuclear and radiation safety, as appropriate,
- 1. Receiving information from the state authorities and entities for the safety assessment;
- m. Control over preparedness of licensees to possible emergency situation;
- n. In case of emergencies, assessment of situation and on the basis of prognosis on its possible changes submission of proposals on implementation of necessary protective actions to the state authority of the RA empowered with the responsibility for emergency situation related issues;
- o. Organization and coordination of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other obligations of the Republic of Armenia;
- p. Control over the safeguards implementation in connection the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- q. State registration and maintaining state register of nuclear materials, ionizing radiation sources and radioactive waste;
- r. Jointly with the authority empowered with responsibilities for foreign affairs within its jurisdictions control over fulfillment of commitments undertaken under the international treaties of the RA in the atomic energy utilization field;
- s. Coordinating the national and regional programs of the RA within the framework of technical cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- t. Making early international notification on an emergency, in accordance with to the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification in case emergencies at the atomic energy utilization installation or in activities implementing there;

- u. Cooperating with international organizations and regulatory authorities of other countries on safety and information exchange, concludes international agreements;
- v. Environmental radiation monitoring and control;
- w. State regulation (within its jurisdictions) of physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear installations jointly with the RA Police and the National Security Service;
- x. ANRA state inspectors perform inspections of nuclear installations and of activities carried out there freely, using the necessary measurement and registration instruments, including audio and video recorders.
- y. ANRA state inspectors enter service and industrial sites of nuclear installations freely,
- z. In the order established in the RA legislation and the international agreements involving specialists from the RA ministries, other state authorities, entities as well as international organizations in regulatory practices.


The specialists with the appropriate qualifications from the ANRA's Nuclear Safety and Radiation Safety Departments from civil servant's status have become civil contractors, starting from 2025. Based on this change their remuneration has increased. At the same time, based on the mentioned Government Decree, additional allowances were established, including those based on competence and working years at ANRA. As a result of these changes, the salaries of ANRA's staff from the mentioned technical departments have significantly increased. ANRA hopes this changes will prevent the outflow of the specialists from the organization.

The organizational structure of ANRA is provided in Annex 5.

ANRA Human Resources

ANRA staff list as of 01.08.2025 includes 43 positions. At present 35 out of 43 positions are occupied at ANRA; 25 out of 35 are the professional staff, 5 out of 25 have PhD, 8 have more than 10 years' work experience at the Armenian NPP.

ANRA organizes training of new staff in accordance with the individual programs consisting of theoretical (on the job self-training) and practical trainings. The resources of IAEA, US NRC and EC cooperation programs are used for implementation of separate tasks concerned with training, improvement and maintaining of the personnel qualification.



Dynamics of ANRA Staffing

ANRA is financed from the State Budget of the RA. The budget for 2025 is 440,434,000 Armenian Drams (AD) (approximately 1.146,635.08 USD), which is approximately for 120,503,800 AD more than in 2022. 67,577,328AD (approximately 175,932.2 USD) is allocated for funding the technical support organization of ANRA – Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center.

To function effectively and to continually improve the regulatory performance ANRA has established a process oriented quality management system. ANRA QMS is represented in the management handbook. ANRA QMS is a set of interrelated or interacting processes that establish policies and objectives and which enables those objectives to be achieved in safe, efficient and effective manner. ANRA QMS has been revised and brought in compliance with the IAEA GS-R-3 in accordance with the recommendations of the IRRS mission. ANRA plans to make another revision of its QMS for bringing in compliance with the GSR part 2 in accordance with the recommendations of the IRRS follow-up mission.

To improve safety and physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials, to promote non-proliferation and to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials ANRA cooperates with the international organizations and regulatory authorities of other countries.

ANRA has cooperation agreements with the following regulatory authorities:

- United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) in frame of the Arrangement between the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters. The arrangement was signed on 27 March 2017 and expired on 29 March 2022. The new arrangement was signed on 15 March 2023.
- Rostekhnadzor in frame of the Agreement between the Federal Authority of Russia on Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the State Authority of Armenia on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (23 May 1994);
- Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Belarus Republic in frame of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the

Government of the Republic of Belarus on cooperation for exchange of information and on nuclear safety and radiation protection (signed in May 2012);

• State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority in frame of the agreement between on cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection (signed on 26 October 2016).

In frame of EC INSC, IAEA technical cooperation projects ANRA cooperates with:

- Bel V, (a subsidiary of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control), Belgium;
- Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA), Bulgaria;
- Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), Germany;
- Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France;
- Nuclear Research Institute Řež plc (NRI Řež), Czech Republic;
- Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland (STUK);
- Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority (UJD SR);
- State Office for Nuclear Safety (SUJB), Czech Republic.
- And other.

ANRA has no advisory committees. The Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the RA Prime Minister (former the Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the RA President) in accordance with its statute approved under the RA Prime Minister decree №1164-A as of September 3, 2018:

- Makes proposals on safety and safety improvement in the nuclear energy field;
- Makes analysis and proposals on measures aimed to improve the safety and reliability of Armenian NPP operation.

The state republican authorities are the ministries of the RA, state authorities under the RA Government. The RA Government structure and the position of ANRA within the structure are provided in the Annex 4.

In accordance with the Article 17 (j) and its statute ANRA submits annual report to the RA Government on nuclear and radiation safety of the RA, its certain territories and nuclear installations.

Thus, the regulatory authority for nuclear safety regulation has been established at the RA; it is provided with relevant jurisdictions, human and financial resources and there is an effective separation between the functions of ANRA from the agencies responsible for promotion of nuclear energy.

Technical support to ANRA is provided by the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), which is a scientific and technical company established under the Government Decree №342 as of April 25, 2001.

NRSC hires staff on the contractual basis and currently employs about 25 specialists (with an average age of 35 years), including:

- PhD holders 4;
- PhD students 3;
- Engineers & physicists 17;
- IT specialists 2;
- Management & Administration 6.

NRSC provides technical and expert support to ANRA in the following areas:

- Expertise of design changes and safety justifications in frame of licensing of the Armenian NPP safety upgrades;
- Technical review of the revised SAR of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 and safety assessments performed in framework of the Armenian NPP lifetime extension;
- Technical review of the safety analysis report of the spent fuel storage facility;
- Technical support to licensing of ionizing radiation sources;
- Technical support to inspection activities at nuclear installations, facilities where ionizing radiation sources are present, radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities;
- Development of draft regulations related to the nuclear and radiation safety, radioactive waste management;
- Development and application of analytical models (including the PSA Level 1 models) for safety analyses and application of models to support the regulatory decision making process;
- Development of procedures for the ANRA ERC activation and operation and involvement in the emergency response teams of ANRA;
- Participation in regulatory actions for strengthening control over radiation sources according to the IAEA recommendations.

The technical and expert support of NRSC allows ANRA to make decision on nuclear and radiation safety regulation in a timely manner. With NRSC's support, ANRA organizes training and retraining of its personnel, including on-the-job training.

3.2 STATUS OF THE REGULATORY BODY

The position of ANRA within the RA Government structure is demonstrated in Annex 4. The organizational structure of ANRA is provided in Annex 5. The information on status, jurisdictions, responsibilities, reporting obligations of ANRA is provided in the section 3.1- Establishment of the Regulatory Body.

4 RESPONSIBILITY OF LICENCE HOLDER

Article 9. Responsibility of the Licence Holder

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.

In accordance with the Article 19 paragraph 2 of the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes and the Statute (point 1.2.1.6) of Armenian NPP the prime responsibility for safe operation of safety important installation rests with the operating organization – "HAEK" CJSC. "HAEK" CJSC is managed by the Director General and Armenian NPP is managed by the Director.

In accordance with the Article 20 of the Law the operating organization:

- a. Develops and implements safety measures in the nuclear installation;
- b. Ensures that a safety culture is maintained;

- c. In the manner prescribed periodically submits reports on the safety of the nuclear installation to the regulatory authority;
- d. Ensures the use of nuclear, radioactive and special materials, special equipment and technologies as intended;
- e. Ensures the physical protection of nuclear installation, nuclear, radioactive and special materials, special equipment and technologies;
- f. Develops the quality assurance programme for each stage in the lifetime of the nuclear installation (site selection, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning) and ensures its implementation;
- g. Organises the control of dose limits amongst personnel in the manner prescribed;
- h. Organises the accounting and control of nuclear, radioactive and special materials and radioactive waste;
- i. Organises and conducts investigations in the manner prescribed into incidents and accidents occurring during the operation of nuclear installations;
- j. In the manner prescribed develops the response plan for emergencies occurring in the nuclear installation and ensures the preparedness of personnel and the necessary resources for its implementation;
- k. Develops the programme of activities for protection against fire in the nuclear installation and ensures its implementation;
- 1. Organises the recruitment and training of skilled personnel to work in the nuclear installation, or with nuclear and radioactive materials;
- m. Ensures that the health and social conditions governing the personnel of the nuclear installation are in accordance with the current regulations;
- n. Carries out periodical safety assessments of the installation to ascertain its compatibility with the most recent safety requirements;
- o. Performs other authorities determined by this Law and other legislative and legal acts of the Republic of Armenia.

The operating organisation of the nuclear installation carries out the following tasks important in terms of safety:

- a. Establishes the services that control the nuclear and radiation safety;
- b. Organises the permanent control over the radiation situation in the controlled and supervised areas of the nuclear installation;
- c. Provides periodically the governor (mayor of Yerevan) of the territory included in the supervised area of the nuclear installation with information in the established order on the radiation situation in the supervised area.

ANRA ensures that the operator discharges its prime responsibility for safety by establishment of safety requirements and regulations, inspections and assessment, control over compliance with the legislation as well as with the licence terms and conditions, and imposing enforcement actions and in case of detecting violation of licence terms and conditions up to suspension and termination of license.

5 PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Article 10 Priority to Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.

In accordance with the Article 5 of the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, the RA shall implement such a policy in the atomic energy utilization field where priority is given to safety. In accordance with the Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes and the Statute of Armenian NPP the prime responsibility for safe operation of Armenian NPP rests with the operating organization.

The Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (former Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the President of the Republic of Armenia) has been established to advice on the safety improvement of Armenian NPP.

Realizing the role and responsibility of the operating organization for safety, in 2004 Armenian NPP management adopted the declaration on safety policy and quality, where the priority to safety is expressed as follows: "The highest priority of our activity, dominating even the factor of production itself, is the safety of Armenian NPP and the personnel..."

Armenian NPP established the relevant organizational structure to implement properly the functions assigned. The following administrative management functions were taken into account when establishing the organizational structure:

- Establishment of production targets and management objectives;
- Development of management policy (including the period of the extended operation lifetime of the Armenian NPP) in the following areas of activity, such as nuclear safety and quality, safety culture, environmental safety, radiation safety, personnel management, physical protection, public information, labor and industrial safety, negative attitudes to the use of drugs and alcohol;
- Establishment of administrative management programs;
- Ensuring operation, including the decision-making process and actions for the plant operation, both during normal and in accident conditions;
- Support, including obtaining technical and administrative services and equipment necessary for operation from organizations located both on the site and outside it;
- Control and supervision of Armenian NPP operation in accordance with NTD requirements and operation procedures.

"HAEK" CJSC safety management authorities are as follows:

- "HAEK" CJSC safety council;
- "HAEK" CJSC committee on personnel qualification and training;
- "HAEK" CJSC scientific and technical council;
- "HAEK" CJSC emergencies committee;
- ALARA committee;
- Committee on investigation of failures, accidents, and events (dedicated committees on identification of failure causes and development of compensating measures).

The HAEK CJSC Safety Council is a permanently acting authority reporting to the General Director of the HAEK CJSC. It reviews the most important and strategic issues related to safety and operation of the ANPP.

The HAEK CJSC committee on personnel qualification and training specifies the HAEK CJSC policy in personnel training and makes decisions in this area.

The HAEK CJSC scientific and technical council is a permanently acting authority reporting to the General Director of the HAEK CJSC. The STC shall review and make decisions on the HAEK CJSC technical policy and strategic planning of technical issues.

The HAEK CJSC emergencies committee is a coordinating authority of the HAEK CJSC emergency response system and it is meant for organization and implementation of actions for management and mitigation of accident consequences.

The ALARA committee reviews the most important issues related to optimization of radiation protection and maintaining both individual and collective dose rates at as low as reasonably achievable level.

The following activities are implemented in order to maintain the proper level of safety culture at Armenian NPP:

- Continuous popularization of safety priority including regular training of different category managers
 and personnel to principles and characteristics of safety culture, ways and methods for improving the
 existing level of safety culture;
- Self-assessments of safety culture in the departments and in the organization in whole;
- Development and implementation of corrective actions for improving the safety culture based on results of implemented self-assessments, and also international missions and peer reviews;
- Invitation of WANO support expert mission for leadership.

To enhance the safety culture Armenian NPP periodically performs self-assessments of the safety culture and the safety management system. Such self-assessments are performed once in three years in accordance with the approved guideline on self-assessment:

- Guideline on Periodic Internal Safety Reviews and Analyses,
- Guideline on Self-Assessment of Safety and Reliability Management,
- Guideline on Operations Management System,
- Guideline on Self-Assessment of Safety Culture and Efficiency of Safety Management System,
- Guideline on Internal Commission Review of Armenian NPP Nuclear Safety.
- Guideline on Structure and Content of Annual Report on Assessment of Operational Safety of the Armenian NPP Unit 2.

In accordance with requirement, in 2024, work began on the periodic internal inspection and analysis of the nuclear safety of Armenian NPP, which is planned to be completed in 2025.

In compliance with the requirements of the Guideline on Operations Management System the self-assessment of the "safety culture level" were carried out in various departments of CJSC "HAEK", and at the end of 2024, work began on a comprehensive self-assessment of the safety culture of the entire enterprise, which is planned to be completed in the first half of 2025.

In compliance with requirements, in 2024, an internal commission of CJSC "HAEK" conducted an inspection of the nuclear safety status of ANPP.

The WANO Moscow Center implemented the following missions over the last years.

- Peer review mission in 2022
- Support mission on the topic "Effectiveness of the management system. Early identification of signs of declining performance" in 2022
- Follow-up corporate review mission in 2022
- Support missions on the topic "Enhanced monitoring" in 2023 and 2024
- Support mission on the topic "Corporate Oversight" in 2024.

Based on the results of the missions the corrective actions were developed and agreed with the management of WANO MC, and are implemented in compliance with the established terms.

The existing Quality Assurance Program (QA Program) for the operational phase of the Armenian NPP lifecycle describes all activities of the Armenian NPP which include thirty business processes (directions of activity), both administrative and technological ones. The main functions of the administrative management and separate subdivisions for the management of the specified business processes are described in the QA Program.

ANRA has developed the "Guidelines for Regulatory Oversight of Safety Culture in Licensees' Organizations" which has been approved by order of Chairman of ANRA. In development of this guidance ANRA used international experience. The guidance contains all necessary information to allow ANRA performing systematic programme of overseeing licensee's safety culture, including during inspection.

6 FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Article 11 Financial and human resources

- 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life.
- 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.

6.1 FINANCIAL RESOURCES

In accordance with the Article 19¹ of the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes the operating organization shall allocate financial resources from consumption of energy (services rendered) for nuclear, radiation, and technical safety, fire protection, physical protection, nuclear material account and control, implementation of safety upgrades, scientific and technical support, as well as securities needed for storage of spent nuclear fuel and for decommissioning. The source of the NPP financial resources is the revenue from the electricity (capacity) sale, according to the tariff approved by the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PSRC) and funds provided by the state budget of the Republic of Armenia in the form of budgetary credits.

The financial securities for decommissioning of nuclear installations are accumulated on a special account of the Ministry of Finance the RA. The use of these financial means in other purposes is prohibited. The RA Government adopted a decree №1637-N as of October 12, 2006 on opening a special account for decommissioning of Armenian NPP that establishes the procedure of servicing and transfer of amounts to the account and reporting.

The safety upgrades are financed from the own resources of Armenia, as well as under EC, IAEA, US DOE, Czech Republic and other countries assistance programs.

6.2 HUMAN RESOURCES

Selection, training, examination and permit to work of the Armenian NPP personnel are arranged in compliance with the "Administrative Control Program. Armenian NPP personnel development" and the Guidelines on "Organization of Armenian NPP personnel training".

Armenian NPP has established internal procedures addressing selection, training, probation and qualification of personnel based on the relevant IAEA documents.

The list of positions implementing safety important activities has been established by the RA Government. Qualification of persons holding position included into this list is checked by ANRA in compliance with the procedure established under the RA Government Decree № 768 as of December 22, 1999 on approval of the list of activities and positions of authority important for safety in atomic energy utilization.

In frame of IAEA and US DOE projects on providing assistance to Armenian NPP, activities on implementation of systematic approach to training (SAT) are performed; and guidelines, regulations and procedures were developed and implemented for this purpose. These documents describe methods of developing training materials and conduct of training.

Analysis of the requirements to knowledge and training is based on the method of analyzing specifics of work and tasks of certain positions and of Armenian NPP on the whole.

Training and maintaining qualification of Armenian NPP personnel are conducted in accordance with the approved standard and individual programs which specify types of training and sequence, as well as the simulator training (the requirement to simulator training is established in the training program).

The scope of the personnel training at the Armenian NPP arranged in 2024 covers:

Training title	Persons	
General training	34	
Initial training	48	
Qualification improvement	58	
Maintaining qualification:		
- High level management	58	
- Medium level management	90	
- Engineering and technical support personnel	120	
- Operating personnel of control room	56	
- Operating personnel (besides control room)	216	
- Repair personnel	285	
- Training on full-scale simulator	179	
Training of personnel on the operation of steam boilers to obtain a permit to work in a gas household	21	
Training of operators of loading machines to ensure safety during transport and technological operations	20	
Training on modernizations and changes made during the annual scheduled outage in 2021	254	

Extinguishing fires on electrical installations under loads at the AAPP facilities of	52
Preparation of repair documentation	38
Implementation of sling operations	11
Severe accident management	18
Leadership for NPP shift supervisors	28
Operational decision making	27
In total:	1607

General training of newly recruited personnel, initial training, maintenance of qualifications, advanced training and briefing (introductory, initial, repeated, unplanned, targeted and pre-shift) are implemented at the Armenian NPP.

The centralized general training, theoretical training during primary training, maintaining qualification and training on simulator are implemented in the Training Center of Armenian NPP.

The initial training for the operational personnel of the control room to develop practical skills to occupy the position and the annual training for maintaining qualifications are arranged on the full-scale simulator (FSS) of Armenian NPP.

The process modes simulated on FSS correspond to the operating modes of the Armenian NPP Unit №2. The scope of the Armenian NPP operation modes simulated on FSS enables to provide with the MCR personnel training and qualification maintaining.

In the frame of joint projects on nuclear safety with the participation of the US Department of Energy (DOE), the specialists of the "Armatom" Institute and WSC the modernized the simulator for the transfer of software and hardware of the full-scope simulator to the new WINDOWS platform, with a new modern computer park and the corresponding software.

In case of modifications to the Armenian NPP Unit №2 (installation of new equipment) during annual outage and refueling and etc., the similar modifications are made also to the FSS in order to bring it in conformity with the Armenian NPP Unit №2 configuration.

Under the US DOE support activities, the symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines are developed. The experts of US DOE group perform appropriate training with Armenian NPP and contractor personnel involved in the mentioned activities. With the assistance of the EC, educational materials were developed for the training of the control room personnel in the application of symptom-oriented emergency operational procedures.

The symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures are currently modified based on comments and recommendations of independent review as well as changes resulted due modifications of the safety systems implemented in 2020-2024.

According to the work plan on improvement of the Armenian NPP personnel training system and under the US DOE and the IAEA assistance projects, regular training (theoretical part) activities for maintenance personnel and engineering technical personnel are implemented at the NPP training center. The practical training of the mentioned personnel is performed in the work places of the relevant structural departments.

The training programmes are periodically revised and corrected taking into account training analysis, feedback of departments, comments and suggestions of trainees.

The self-assessment of personnel training system efficiency and the needs analysis for personnel training system improvement have been performed at Armenian NPP. According to the results of activities performed, the appropriate recommendations and action plans for their implementation were developed, including the training programme improvement.

Information of IAEA, WANO, Armenian NPP and other information systems in relation to operational events is carefully studied and covered in the training programs of the Armenian NPP personnel.

Training of the relevant Armenian NPP personnel on modernization of equipment, system and activities performed during outages is implemented.

The sufficiency of Armenian NPP personnel is established by the standard number and the staff list (to be approved by the Board of Directors) taking into account the scope and complexity of the servicing equipment that ensure the NPP safe operation, as well as by the regular leaves provided to employees and the time allocated to training. The method of personnel number redundancy is additionally applied for positions important from the safety point of view.

The nuclear safety related activities are performed by the Armenian NPP personnel authorized to perform these types of activities. Specific activities related to nuclear safety are performed by organizations involved in implementation of the nuclear safety related practices and having certificates accepted by ANRA.

Qualification of the contractor personnel is examined before the contract is concluded according to the service purchase procedure.

Armenian NPP is not responsible for the contractor personnel training. However, the contractors' personnel, if needed, participate in workshops or training courses implemented at Armenian NPP in order to perform certain activities at Armenian NPP in the established order.

ANRA performs inspections to verify the sufficiency of human resources at the Armenian NPP in accordance with the inspection program.

Based on the inspections results ANRA develops the report with indication of the inspection results, identified deficiencies and the date of their elimination and transmits it to Armenian NPP.

Armenian NPP in the established order informs ANRA about measures undertaken to eliminate deficiencies identified during the regulatory inspections.

7 HUMAN FACTORS

Article 12. Human Factors

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

The design of any modification takes into account the human factor with implementation of the "Operator non-interference" principle. The operators will not be able to interfere in the software operation within 10 minutes after violation of normal operation condition of the new system. In 10 minutes these systems provide the operators with information on possible and allowed actions.

All activities on the safety systems are implemented in accordance with the programs approved by the Armenian NPP Chief Engineer.

The functions connected with human and organizational factors management in the operating organization are distributed among the divisions. In particular, the aspects concerned with investigation and analysis of event connected with the human and organizational factors are assigned to the Operating Experience Department, the aspects connected with the organizational factor management are assigned to the Quality Assurance Department, training aspects and activity motivation are assigned to the Training Center, and aspects connected with the "man-machine" interface are assigned to the Engineering Support Department.

Analysis of the events connected with human activity and organizational factors, shows the following main typical causes of errors:

- Incorrect, non-appropriate implementation of technological operations (errors at making switches);
- Uncoordinated actions;
- Deviation from work programs, procedures and other documents;
- Poor maintenance, violation of maintenance technology;
- Poor assembling (unreliable tightening, reduction of detachable parts, sealing);
- Insufficient monitoring of the systems/components condition and of implemented technological operations.

The developed corrective measures are aimed at improving procedures taking into account the human factor, improving issues related to ergonomics and the "man-machine" interface, improving personnel activities by applying various methods of reducing errors at the levels of the doer, manager and facility.

In order to perform an assessment of administrative and organizational issues Armenian NPP implements a self-assessment program covering various levels of the organization.

The program envisages implementation of regular self – assessments on:

- Corporate level;
- Level of separate areas of activity;
- Level of structural divisions;
- Individual level of personnel.

The purpose of self-assessments on different levels is to determine the effectiveness of the management system on the given level, to detect deficiencies connected with managerial and organizational issues, as well as to comply with requirements of the international standards and good practices.

The standard guideline on organization and performance of self-assessments was developed to ensure the structural approach to self-assessments in different areas of activities and in different divisions.

By now, self-assessments of safety culture of the whole company, efficiency of safety and reliability management system, operations management system, the personnel training system, maintenance and repair, radiation protection, operating experience, activity of start-to end shifts, emergency preparedness system, etc., have been performed.

Justification of a modification requires assessment of changes both in core damage frequency and failure probability of the given system due to the modification. Also, the pre-accident and post-accidents errors of personnel shall be considered.

ANRA implements the regulatory control over human factor and associated organizational measures of the operating organization through inspections. In case of events important to safety ANRA within its jurisdictions when necessary conducts independent investigation, detects root causes of personnel errors, impose enforcement actions.

At review and granting permission on modification ANRA verifies availability of systematic ergonomic analysis of this modification from the point of view of safety, reliability and usefulness for Armenian NPP, and also preparedness of the personnel to operate under new conditions.

8 OUALITY ASSURANCE

Article 13 Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programmers are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

The Quality Assurance Program (QAP) of Armenian NPP was developed in accordance with the requirements of IAEA (Safety Series №50-C/SG-Q "Quality assurance for safety in Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Installations"); it was approved in 2004 and then revised in the established order. Then it was revised in the established order in regard to compliance with current IAEA requirements to management systems, and also, international ISO standards.

The present QAP is developed for Armenian NPP operation and covers the entire scope of the Armenian NPP activities. QAP summarizes the management processes for 30 areas of activities and references. More detailed descriptions of the management processes on the level of sub-processes are provided in the guidelines. Thus, the administrative management program with its set of guidelines for a specific activity provides a detailed and complete description of a process, including distribution of responsibilities of personnel and divisions.

A number of documents included in the management system have been developed and implemented over the last years at Armenian NPP. The documents cover all safety aspects, such as nuclear safety, radiation safety, industrial safety, fire protection and seismic safety, as well as system of management and control of works performed by the contractors.

In accordance with the RA Government Decree №461-N as of April 19, 2012 and the RA Government Decree №1085-N as of August 23, 2012 the "QAP for Armenian NPP Unit №2 lifetime extension" was developed to ensure the quality of measures on preparation to the Armenian NPP operation lifetime extension.

In accordance with the RA Government Decree №461-N as of April 19, 2012 and the RA Government Decree №1085-N as of August 23, 2012 the "QAP for Armenian NPP Unit №2 lifetime extension" was developed to ensure the quality of measures on preparation to the Armenian NPP operation lifetime extension.

Besides, Armenian NPP has a Quality Audit Program for systematic assessment of all types of activities. The Audit Program includes a document specifying requirements to organization and conduct of quality audits, training of auditors, as well as a three-year audit schedule, which is to be annually revised. The schedule contains tentative dates of audit for three years and includes audit of works and services of suppliers. Such approach allows ensuring auditing every field of activity important to safety at least once in 3-4 years. With this, unscheduled quality audits are foreseen at a separate request of the top management of Armenian NPP.

As a result of quality audits, corrective measures are developed with further control over their implementation by the responsible persons.

Armenian NPP, using the relevant IAEA documents, has developed guidelines that establish the types, methods, as well as the procedure for conducting audits of quality system of vendors of equipment, materials, activities (including nuclear and radiation hazardous) and services. Quality audits are the planned activities of Armenian NPP. The purpose of the audits of vendors is to guarantee that only those vendors are allowed to make supplies to Armenian NPP, whose capability to ensure that products meet the established requirements is verified, objectively proven, documented and controlled. In addition, a dedicated organization was involved in assessing the conformity of products with the established requirements within the framework of the LTE project.

For the regulatory control over the quality assurance of Armenian NPP ANRA:

- Conducts planned and reactive inspections;
- Identifies the QA condition and dynamics of its change;

- Verifies and assesses the preparedness of personnel and understanding of the quality policy adopted by the personnel;
- Verifies availability and quality of the QA programs;
- Assesses measures for detection of inconsistencies and implementation of corrective measures;
- Analyses self-assessment reports of all levels and audit results;
- Makes independent assessment of effectiveness of the quality management system;
- Assesses measures aimed for the quality management system improvement and makes recommendations and proposals;
- Imposes enforcement actions when deficiencies are detected and identifies deadlines for elimination of those deficiencies and controls over the implementation.

9 ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Article 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

- (i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatory body;
- (ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions.

9.1 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY

The safety assessment of nuclear power plants is conducted in a comprehensive, in-depth and systematic manner, incorporating the requirements of national regulations in force in Republic of Armenia, regulatory guides of ANRA as well as the applicable requirements and recommendations from

- o IAEA Safety Standards,
- o relevant international standards, like WENRA reference levels,
- o other authoritative documents, like vendor country regulatory documents, included in the design basis of ANPP and approved as applicable regulations for ANPP by the Government of Armenia

The assessment process draws upon own and international operating experience and lessons learned, as well as advancements in science and technology.

Legislative requirements mandates safety assessments for all phases of the NPP lifecycle, including siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation (including long-term operation), decommissioning, and covering the necessary competences and activities of the license holder, including the conduct of periodic nuclear safety reviews.

The Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes establishes, in particular:

• Commitments and responsibilities of the operating organization to submit to the regulatory authority the annual reports on current safety state of the unit and its compliance with the rules and standards existing in the RA;

• Commitments and responsibilities of the operating organizations to submit periodical safety assessments and analysis on safety state of the unit with respect to its compliance with the newly adopted regulatory rules and standards.

The Law of the RA on Licensing establishes types of practices subject to licensing in the nuclear energy field. The licensing procedures establishing rights, responsibilities, order, content and form of application documents supporting documents for obtaining a license for a specific practice (see Annex 2) have been adopted under the RA Government decrees.

At present in accordance with the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes and the legal acts the NPP licensing consists of 5 stages:

- Site selection:
- Design;
- Construction;
- Operation;
- Decommissioning.

On the stage of licensing the site selection in accordance with the RA Government Decree N 609-N as of 12.05.2005 the operating organization, among the others, should submit the following documentation in support to the licence application:

- General description of the design of the nuclear installation to be constructed on the particular site;
- The quality assurance program of the site selection for the nuclear installation;
- Results of public hearing in relation to the site selection for the nuclear installation.

The list of organizations involved in the site selection, copies of their statutes and information on necessary professional qualifications of personnel for site selection of applicant and those organizations, and the documents certifying the availability of technical means and software.

On the stage of licensing the NPP construction in accordance with the RA Government Decree № 649-N as of 12.05.2005 the operating organization among the others should submit the following documentation in support to the licence application:

- General design of nuclear installation;
- Design of nuclear installation being constructed;
- Preliminary safety analysis report;
- NPP environmental impact assessment report and conclusion;
- PSA Report;
- Results of public hearing.

On the stage of licensing the NPP operation in accordance with the RA Government Decree N 400-N as of 24.03.2005 the operating organization should among the others submit the following documentation in support to the licence application:

- Final safety analysis report;
- PSA report;
- Technical specification for operation of nuclear installation;
- Safety systems classification;

- Emergency response plan;
- Technological specification and instruction on NPP systems operation;
- Plan of fire protection measures.

On the stage of licensing the NPP decommissioning the RA Government Decree № 707-N as of 01.06.2005 the operating organization should among the others submit the following documentation in support to the licence application:

- Decommissioning program;
- Safety analysis report at NPP decommissioning;
- Program on management of radioactive wastes generated during decommissioning of nuclear installation;
- Plan on emergency response at decommissioning.

Based on operation licence condition, licensee should submit annual report on safety assessment of the unit.

ANRA revised the requirements to the contents and format of Armenian NPP Unit №2 SAR enforced under the RA Government Decree № 2013-N as of November 21, 2001, taking into account IAEA GS-G-4.1 and SSG-61 guides.

In accordance with the licence terms and conditions Armenian NPP will develop the PSR report in 2026.

The development of the new version of the SAR in compliance with the requirements to the format and contents of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 SAR approved under the RA Government Decree №751-N as of June 28, 2018 was undertaken in 2019. The "Atomservice" CJSC and "Armatom" CJSC participated in the development of the SAR with financial and technical support of the US DOE.

In 2022 new version of SAR was issued, taking into account updated National legislation and IAEA GS-G-4.1 and SSG-61 guides.

In frame of the LTE licensing the Armenian NPP performed a lot of safety enhancement measures.

The PSA Level 1 for internal initiating events was updated at the end of 2021, and the core damage frequency (CDF) is 1.192x10⁻⁵ 1/year. The main contributors to the CDF were the following:

Grouped IEs	% in CDF	CDF due to grouped IEs
Leaks directly resulting in core damage	16.70%	2E-06
Primary to secondary circuit leaks	44.22%	5.27E-06
Primary circuit leaks	14.06%	1.68E-06
Transients	3.92%	4.67E-07
Power excursion	7.35%	8.76E-07
Loss of main condensate	5.01%	5.97E-07
Loss of power	1.40%	1.67E-07
Secondary circuit breaks	4.70%	5.61E-07

In 2024 the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center completed the PSA Level 1 for external hazards. Total CDF due to external hazards is 1.3E-06 1/year.

The calculations results for the external initiating event effects on the CDF are as follows:

• Dust storm 1.14E-06

• Low air temperature 2.11E-07

•	Snow load	1.31E-08
•	Lighting	8.08·10-8
•	Airplane crash	3.91·10-8
•	Strong wind	3.89E-10

The rest contributors which were screened during qualitative and quantitative screening were negligible.

Total CDF due to internal fire is 5.91E-06 1/year. The risk of internal flooding at the ANPP is insignificant, the estimated CDF due to internal flooding is 3.09E-08 1/year.

The Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center, completed the seismic PSA in 2023. Total seismic CDF was assessed as 9.11E-06 1/year.

The whole sector of seismic effects was divided into eight intervals. The CDF for each seismic interval is:

•	Interval 0 (peak ground acceleration 0.05-0.1 g)	1.02E-07 1/year
•	Interval 1 (peak ground acceleration 0.1-0.2 g)	2.71E-08 1/ year
•	Interval 2 (peak ground acceleration 0.2-0.4 g)	3.77E-07 1/ year
•	Interval 3 (peak ground acceleration 0.4-0.6 g)	1.44E-06 1/ year
•	Interval 4 (peak ground acceleration 0.6-0.8 g)	3.28E-06 1/ year
•	Interval 5 (peak ground acceleration 0.8-1 g)	1.86E-06 1/ year
•	Interval 6 (peak ground acceleration 1-1,5 g)	1.93E-06 1/ year
•	Interval 7 (peak ground acceleration ≥1.5g)	1.0E-07 1/ year

The current status of PSA models and results for the Armenian NPP are provided in the Table 1. **Table 1 - PSA results**.

№	PSA type	CDF [1/y]
1	Internal initiating events	1.19E-05
2	Internal fires	5.91E-06
3	Seismic	9.11E-06
4	External initiating events (except for seismic)	1.3E-06

Currently ANPP performs Periodic Safety Review of ANPP in line with IAEA Safety Standard SSG-25 "Periodic Safety Review for NPPs". IAEA Expert Mission reviewed Basis document for the ANPP PSR. Recommendations and suggestions of Expert mission will be used for update of PSR Basis Document in line with IAEA Safety Standard SSG-25.

New equipment qualification requirements were enforced by ANRA in 2017. Based on these requirements in 2018 Armenian NPP started development of the equipment qualification program.

ANRA uses its TSO, i.e. the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), for assessment of certain aspects of the Armenian NPP safety. In the reporting period the following activities were performed by NRSC for the regulatory decision-making:

- Analysis of the peculiarities of the Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) assemblies;
- Investigation of the accidents with LOCA of the ANPP Unit 2 primary circuit taking into account the changed characteristics of the spray system;
- Analysis of various options of ECCS modification under the scope of the LTO activities;
- Development of INSPECTOR special tool to assess the significance of incidents at ANPP and the impact of the failure of ANPP's components on the safety of the plant;
- Investigation of the characteristics of the WWER-440 reactor with the reduced core;
- Analysis of the licensing procedures on the site selection and NPP construction;
- Validation of the ANPP PSA model developed in the SAPHIRE environment with a comparative analysis with the model developed with RiskSpectrum to be used for the regulatory purposes;
- Estimation of the size of the emergency response zone for the ANPP site in case of deployment of NuScale SMR as well as calculation of the isotopic composition of the NuScale SMR core and source term;
- Calculation of dose rates in the air with MicroShield and MCNP 6.2 codes for the waste management purposes.
- Development of independent PRA model for ANRA using SAPHIRE code;
- Upgrade and validation of the reactor core reflector model for ANPP;
- Development of Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for ANRA;
- Investigation of the NUSCALE power plant seismic design suitability for the ANPP new unit seismic environment.

In accordance with the procedure on modifications, ANRA performs assessment and licensing of safety and safety important modifications.

9.2 VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

The main programmes used for verification of the state of Armenian NPP are:

- Periodic testing of the safety important systems according to the operational limits and conditions;
- Preventive and predictive maintenance programme;
- In-service inspection programme;
- Periodic inspections of the pressure equipment and piping;
- Surveillance programme of the reactor pressure vessel material;
- Programmes for evaluation of the components and materials ageing.

Activities for verification of the physical condition of Armenian NPP are performed in connection with normal routine and with scheduled inspections, testing, preventive maintenance etc. Detailed programmes and procedures are established and approved by the licensee. They are also reviewed and approved by ANRA. The results of tests and inspections are documented, provided to ANRA and used

through a feedback process for further activities. The operational limits and conditions are approved by ANRA.

To implement Armenian NPP policy in the field of ageing management and to fulfill the regulatory requirements to the ageing management, the "Aging Management Group" was established as part of the resource and operation extension department and the document "Ageing Management System for Ageing Systems, Structures and Components" was developed and implemented and also the specific and plant ageing management programs for specific (groups) of elements based on IGALL ageing management programmes. To ensure effective management of the ageing of elements and structures at Armenian NPP with the support of IAEA, AMS database of I&C Energo Company (Czech Republic) was introduced, which provides input and processing of information on resource characteristics, on the results of the inservice inspection of the NPP equipment metal and special examinations, tests.

According to the terms and condition of the License №MTSH-002-2011 for operation of nuclear installations, Armenian NPP annually assesses the safety condition during the Unit № 2 operation over the past year. The corresponding "Annual report on assessment of safety condition during the Armenian NPP unit №2 operation" is submitted to ANRA.

ANRA on regular basis performs assessment and control over the current level of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 safety through:

- Annual reports on safety assessment of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 operation;
- Regular inspections on assessment of the safety level in accordance with the annual schedule of ANRA;
- Regulatory review of safety cases submitted by Armenian NPP for licensing of safety modifications.

10 RADIATION PROTECTION

Article 15 Radiation Protection

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.

The list of legal acts that establish regulatory requirements to the radiation protection of nuclear installations is provided in Annex 2 of the national report.

The dose limits for workers and public established in the "Radiation safety norms" on the whole are in line with the requirements of GSR part 3.

The Chapter II of the "Radiation safety norms" specifies the requirements to implementation the optimization principle (ALARA).

According to the existing regulations for the new constructed NPPs the dose constraint shall not exceed $100~\mu Sv/year$.

Armenian NPP management adheres to the policy of indisputable safety priority over other concerns and considers the dose optimization principles as the most important means for decreasing the exposure of personnel working in conditions of ionizing radiation stated in "Armenian NPP management declaration about the policy in the area of radiation safety".

The goals, criteria, procedures, administrative limitations on the radiation safety are set taking into consideration:

- Requirements of standard documents;
- International practice in the area of radiation safety;
- Available operational experience of Armenian NPP and other NPPs;
- Need for maximum possible decrease of NPP impact on the environment.

The efficiency of the Armenian NPP radiation safety is evaluated with the following indicators:

- Maximum individual dose;
- Personnel collective dose:
- Amount of radioactive gas and aerosol releases;
- Amount of liquid radioactive substances in effluents;
- Amount of radioactive effluent;
- Number of personnel contamination cases;
- Number of radiation incidents subject to reporting.

The assessment of radiation safety efficiency requires consideration of the above mentioned indicators and corresponding standards ratio, dynamics of indicators, their comparison against similar values which specify radiation safety condition at other similar NPPs.

The ALARA Committee and the ALARA Engineering group were established at Armenian NPP for practical implementation of the radiation protection optimization. The ALARA Committee and the ALARA Engineering group work regularly in close cooperation with all departments of Armenian NPP involved in activities with ionizing radiation sources, and implement activities on the Armenian NPP radiation protection optimization according to the requirements of the program on the Armenian NPP radiation protection management optimization according to ALARA principle.

Annual report is prepared based on the results of the ALARA Committee activity. The report makes a part of Armenian NPP industrial activity annual report.

With the purpose of further implementation of the ALARA principle, the Armenian NPP developed the Radiation Protection Program for 2024 which establishes the objectives and goals for minimizing radiation impact and ensuring effective radiation protection of the Armenian NPP personnel. The objective of ALARA principle is to maintain the annual personnel collective dose rate at as low as reasonably achievable level, in particular:

- Non-exceeding of annual personnel collective dose, 1347 man*mSv;
- Non-exceeding of personnel collective dose during outage, 1240 man*mSv;
- Non-exceeding annual individual dose, 20 mSv;
- Maintaining radioactive gas and aerosol release value below the administrative levels:
 - o Inert radioactive gas $-15*10^{12}$ Bq/year,
 - Long-lived nuclides 46*10⁶ Bq/year,
 - Iodine 11*10⁶ Bq/year;
- Maintaining the amount of radioactive effluents below the administrative levels $\Sigma \beta$ act = 3.7 Bq/l;
- Reducing the number of contaminated people.

Before the outage, measures were developed to ensure radiation safety and to optimize the personnel dose loads during the outage in 2024.

The individual external exposure is monitored once per month with the thermo-luminescence dosimeter (TLD).

To control the exposure dose on a shift basis, in addition to the TLD, the personnel has electronic dosimeters with built-in alarm, which activates when the threshold set both for the dose rate and the cumulative dose is exceeded. The personnel entry into the controlled area is allowed by the system only with both dosimeters. In case of approaching the dose limits set at the Armenian NPP, a failure to pass the test on radiation safety and negative results of medical examination, the system automatically prohibits the entry of the given employee into the controlled area.

The collective and individual maximum dose trends at Armenian NPP are demonstrated on Figures 1-2 of Annex 6.

During the outage in 2024 the actual dose of the ANPP personnel was 721.678 man*mSv. Collective dose of the ANPP personnel for 2024 was 856.51 man*mSv. The maximum individual dose of external exposure was 17.39 mSv.

Airborne and liquid releases from Armenian NPP

The radiation monitoring is implemented in accordance with the "Technical specification on radiation monitoring of Armenian NPP", which specifies the conditions and limits of radioactive releases and effluents (source term).

The airborne releases from Armenian NPP are controlled by the measurement devices located on the ventilation stack (150m height), and the liquid effluents are controlled by taking samples from the boreholes located outside of boundary of Armenian NPP rainwater and sewerage systems. The measurement frequency is described in the technical specification for radiation monitoring.

The annual allowable release of radioactive gases and airborne into the atmosphere and the control levels for release of radioactive gases and airborne into the atmosphere per month are demonstrated on the tables 1 and 2 of Annex 6.

The comparative analysis of values of radioactive releases into atmosphere in 2024 demonstrated that they are on the same level as last year and below average level for the entire operation period.

The expected increase of corrosion origin radionuclide releases during the outage was recorded. Occurrence of this radionuclide is conditioned by the maintenance operations performed on the primary circuit equipment.

It should be noted that the amount of releases and discharges from Armenian NPP is (for several tens of times) below the reference levels and allowable values, specified in the "Sanitary Regulations for the Design and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants" (SP AES-03).

Annual releases of long-lived radionuclides for the period of Armenian NPP operation are provided on Figure 3 of Annex 6.

Annual activities of liquid discharges from Armenian NPP for the operation period are provided in Figure 4 of Annex 6.

Environmental Radiation Impact from Armenian NPP

With the purpose of monitoring the Armenian NPP environmental radiation impact, the quantities of radioactive substances in the air, atmospheric precipitation, open waters, soil, vegetation, and locally produced food (agricultural plants, milk, etc.) in Armenian NPP supervised area (10 km radius) has been estimated.

The environmental radiation monitoring of facilities in the Armenian NPP supervised area and methods of distribution of areas for taking samples are determined taking into account the climatic, geographic, economic, demographic and other factors of the Armenian NPP location area.

The population external exposure control in the Armenian NPP supervised area is performed by the regular dosimetric measurements in the supervised area. In accordance with the periodical measurements results the gamma dose rate in the supervised area (external exposure) varied within 0.1 μ Sv/h - 0.16 μ Sv/h (open areas), which is almost the same as mentioned in the report on radiation situation surveillance dated 1976 before the Armenian NPP commissioning (0.1-0.12 μ Sv/h).

The results of environmental radiation monitoring for 2021 are provided in tables 3-13 of Annex 6.

The comparative analysis of values of radioactive releases into the atmosphere in 2024 demonstrated that they are on the same level as last year and below the average level for the whole operation period. The main contribution to the releases value is provided by the radionuclide ¹³⁷Cs, ⁶⁰Co and ^{110m}Ag (regardless of radioactive noble gases).

The comparative analysis of information obtained and the radiation data bank for the whole NPP operation period demonstrates that radiation situation in Armenian NPP supervised area has not essentially changed. Concentration of radionuclide in all environmental objects is for several orders below the rated values. Radiological situation in the supervised area is normal, no marked deviations compared to the data for the whole period of operation (within measurement accuracy) were observed. Concentration of induced radionuclide (¹³⁷Cs, ⁹⁰Sr) in the environment is conditioned by global fallouts. This conclusion was made based on the analysis of spatial distribution of these radionuclides in the environment objects.

The data provided in this report indicate that the goals specified in the radiation protection program for 2024 were achieved.

Regulatory review and control activities

The regulatory review and control activities cover the review of monthly and annual reports on radiation situation on the Armenian NPP site and its supervised area and on the results of inspections performed at the Armenian NPP covering the following topics:

- Implementation of radiation protection activities included in the program of Armenian NPP safety improvement measures;
- QA programme for the measures implemented in the controlled area;
- Limits and conditions of the radiation protection and safety in accordance with the technical specification on radiation monitoring;
- Occupational radiation protection program and implementation of the ALARA principle;
- ALARA implementation measures during the airborne and liquid releases from the Armenian NPP into the environment and the system of environmental radiation monitoring and public dose control.

In the reporting period the Armenian NPP individual maximum and collective dose values (see Figures 1, 2 of Annex 6) remain below the dose values specified in the standards and are considered acceptable.

The data provided in Tables 3-13 of Annex 6 indicate that the radioactive releases and discharges from Armenian NPP did not result in contamination of air, surrounding areas, land, water, algae, river depositions and contamination of vegetation and local food.

Though the winds blowing from the north-east-east sector prevail in the Armenian NPP supervised area, which in case of higher releases could have led to radioactivity increase in the control points distributed in the relevant sectors, the environmental sampling data demonstrate that the radiation characteristics (dose rates, radioactivity concentration, surface contamination) in all territories of the Armenian NPP

supervised area differ from each other within the allowable error rate of the measurements. The comparison of the measurements data with the ones made before the Armenian NPP operation ("zero-background measurement") demonstrate that the Armenian NPP operation have not led to the environmental contamination.

For the regulatory purposes, in frame of EC Project A3.01/15 "Enhancing the capabilities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority in preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency", the Early Warning Radiation Monitoring System (EWRMS) was established, which includes 32 gamma dose rate monitoring stations and 2 in-field spectroscopic systems. All stations are installed within the radius of 15 km from the Armenian NPP.

Within the same project the JRODOS decision support system was provided to ANRA for emergency management.

11 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Article 16. Emergency preparedness

- 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.
- 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.
- 3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in the event of such an emergency.

11.1 EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROGRAMS

The main legal acts settling the relations concerned with response to nuclear and radiological emergencies are:

- Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes;
- Law of the RA on Population Protection during Emergencies;
- President Ordinance № NK-231-A as of November 17, 2016 on the approval of the strategy for ensuring the biological, chemical and radiological safety of the Republic of Armenia;
- RA Government Decree № 259-A as of March 19, 2015 on approval of the program-schedule for the implementation of measures to ensure the functioning of the population notification system of preventive protective actions zones and urgent protective planning actions zones in case of a threat or radiological or nuclear accident at Armenian NPP;

- Population Protection Plan in case of Nuclear and Radiation Emergencies at Armenian NPP (off-site emergency plan of Armenian NPP) approved under the Government Decree № 2328 as of December 22, 2005:
- RA Government Decree № 943-N as of May 18, 2016 on approval of establishing of regime of implementing rescue works in the areas of radioactive contamination;
- Armenian NPP emergency response plan to nuclear and/or radiation emergencies (On-site plan of the Armenian NPP);
- RA Government Decree № 1219-N as of August 18, 2006 on approval of radiation safety norms;
- RA Government Decree № 1489-N as of August 18, 2006 on approval of radiation safety rules.
- The agreement "On cooperation between CIS member states to ensuring readiness for mutual assistance in eliminating their consequences in the event of a nuclear or radioactive emergency".

The basic framework for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiation emergencies in the RA is established in the above mentioned legal acts, which assign the main roles to the state authorities and other organizations and regulate issues related to different aspects of emergency preparedness and response. The radiation safety norms stipulate the generic optimized intervention levels for taking urgent protective actions for sheltering, evacuation, iodine prophylactic and permanent resettlement, as well as the dose criteria for emergency workers.

Besides the above mentioned, there are a number of legal acts dealing with separate issues concerned with the emergency preparedness (notification, organization and implementation of evacuation, transportation, emergency radiation monitoring, medical response, agricultural countermeasures and so on).

Structure of the National Emergency Response System

The National Plan on Population Protection in case of nuclear and radiological emergencies at Armenian NPP provides with the detailed assessment of organizational measures and allocation of the functions and responsibilities of the operator and the national and local authorities implementing response measures in case of emergencies at the Armenian NPP (Government Decree № 2328-N as of December 22, 2005). This plan had been developed with account taken to the requirements of the IAEA GS-R-2, GS-G-2.1 and EPR-METHOD-2003.

The plan was revised based on GSR part 7, GSG-2 takes into account new radiological intervention criteria established in GSR Part 3. The revised version of the plan has been enforced under the RA Government Decree № 248-N on March, 2018.

According to the National Plan on Population Protection (the off-site plan):

- Armenian NPP is responsible for classification of emergency situation at NPP, prompt notification on emergency situation, bringing the reactor in safe condition and NPP personnel protection;
- Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (MIA) is responsible for warning the national response organizations and population, coordination of population protection measures, organization of emergency radiological monitoring and performing rescue actions in emergency situations. The Armenian Rescue Service (ARS) was functioned within the MES until 2023 and from 2023 the Armenian Rescue Service (ARS) started function within the MIA. The ARS functions as the national coordinator in organization and implementation of population protection measures. To cope with this task there was established the Crisis Management Centre of the MIA equipped with new equipment and communication means. The MIA is the competent authority and the contact point under the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The ARS

transmits radiation monitoring data in area where emergency took place and in adjacent to its territories to the ANRA ERC:

- ANRA is the national advisor in organization of response and also the National Warning Point under the Convention on Early Notification about Nuclear Accident. In case of threat to population ANRA notifies Ministry for Internal Affairs on emerged situation, provides with information on situation in the area where emergency took place;
- Hydrometeorological Service provides ANRA ERC and Ministry for Internal Affairs with the information on meteorological situation in the area where emergency took place and the meteorological prognosis;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RA is responsible for providing information received from ANRA ERC on emergency to the embassies, foreign representative offices and RA Embassies in other countries:
- Ministry of Health of the RA is responsible for provision of medical aid to the affected population, coordination of evacuation of injured persons from contaminated area and participation in organization of decontamination of evacuees;
- Ministry of Defense of the RA is responsible for conducting emergency radiological monitoring, deployment of forces and resources necessary for rescue operations and deployment of decontamination and special treatment units;
- Police (the Ministry of Internal Affairs of RA) is responsible for warning and notification of the population, protection of property and assets of the settlements in the contaminated area and maintaining public order in settlements, organizations, evacuation points, and transportation routes;

The responsibilities of the local authorities on the regional and local levels in the territory included in PAZ or UPZ are indicated in the Armenian NPP off-site plan. The local authorities perform the displacement, reception and the distribution of the displaced people, sheltering and provision of individual protection for the population.

To cope with its task ANRA operates the appropriately equipped Emergency Response Center (ERC) and has relevantly trained emergency personnel. The functions of ANRA ERC groups are:

- Emergency Commission management of the ERC operations;
- NPP technological assessment group assessment of nuclear reactor condition, prognosis on possible changes of the reactor condition, estimation of radioactive releases and discharges and conditions;
- Radiation Situation Assessment and Prognoses Group assessment of situation at the facility or place where accident took place, prognosis on possible changes of situation, development of recommendations on protective measures using the JRODOS system;
- Information and Public Relations Group receiving from and sending to information of the emergency commission, providing information to IAEA, communication with public and mass media.

There are relevant emergency procedures established to ensure functioning of ANRA ERC groups. Among the others there are procedures established that specify sequence of implementation of reactor condition and source term assessment, assessment of radiological situation of the Armenian NPP and adjacent territories, prognosis on situation change, development recommendations on radiation protection of the Armenian NPP personnel, emergency personnel, population and other.

To ensure 24 hours operation of ANRA ERC (in 3 shifts) starting from 2016 all staff members of ANRA and NRSC are included in the respective ERC groups according to the ANRA Chairman order.

The emergency procedures are periodically revised during/after the regular table-top exercises organized in ANRA. The scheme of ANRA ERC and interaction with external organization is provided in Annex 7.

ANRA ERC personnel follows the requirements established in the set of the emergency procedures. In accordance with the ANRA annual work plan trainings of ERC personnel are performed on a quarterly basis. All trainings are organized in accordance with the programs developed for each specific case. The evaluation of actions of each trainee is made after each training based on check-list. Once a year starting from 2016 NRSC as a developer of the package of procedures on activation and organization of ANRA ERC organizes training for ANRA and NRSC personnel involved in ERC activities. Assessment of the personnel actions is performed based on check-lists (as part of the procedure) during the exercises.

Twice a year emergency exercises are organized jointly with Armenian NPP with the purpose to increase the interaction level of ANRA and Armenian NPP personnel involved in the emergency response. National exercises are organized in accordance with the RA Government Decree once per three years.

MIA of RA periodically conducts exercises and drills related to Armenian NPP which are aimed at testing capabilities and skills of the state and local authorities on various levels.

The emergency exercises were conducted with participation of ANRA, Armenian NPP and MIA in 2023 (16 March and 17 August) and 2024 (10 of April and 11 of July), and 2025 (10 of March).

ANRA in accordance with the Conventions "Early notification of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies" and "On Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Event" participated in the emergency preparedness and response exercises organized by the IAEA Emergency Response Center on 05 September 2023 and on 03-04 September 2024 (ConvEx-2b Exercise).

Summary of activities related to Armenian NPP emergency preparedness

The existing emergency response system at Armenian NPP is designed for prevention of emergency situations, prevention or limitation, mitigation of radioactive release impact, localization and timely mitigation of accident consequences.

The Armenian NPP emergency response is implemented by the emergency personnel in the frame of a specially established organizational structure of the emergency response system (ERS). ERS management structure is a part of the general management structure of Armenian NPP.

The manager of emergency activities, i.e. the "HAEK" CJSC General Director, is in charge of the ERS.

Armenian NPP ERS includes the following functional units:

- Manager of emergency activities;
- Committee on emergency situations (CES) of Armenian NPP;
- Operating personnel of Armenian NPP;
- Headquarters of Civil Defense & Emergency Situations;
- Coordinator of public and media relations;
- ERS structural units:
- Personnel of several subdivisions of Armenian NPP;
- RA Police military unit;
- Specialized brigade for Armenian NPP fire protection.

Armenian NPP emergency response system is coordinated by the Committee on Emergency Situations (CES). The chairperson of the CES is the Armenian NPP Chief Engineer. CES activity is implemented under the direction of the manager of emergency activities, i.e. the Armenian NPP General Director.

The headquarter, the Armenian NPP Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Service, is the executive authority of the CES.

The Armenian NPP Notification Scheme is provided in the Annex 8.

Besides the national organizations Armenian NPP cooperates with WANO MC Regional Crisis Center for WWER type reactors on the basis of "ROSENERGOATOM" OJSC Crisis Center. Interaction with the RCC of WANO-MC is regulated by the requirements of the following documents:

- Regulations on the Regional Crisis Center of the NPP with the WWER reactor of the Moscow Center of WANO, registration number R16-2012;
- Regulations for information exchange between the participants of the Regional Crisis Center of NPPs with the WWER reactor of the Moscow Center of WANO, the registration number R15-2013;
- Regulations for the operation of the Regional Crisis Center for Nuclear Power Plants with WWER reactor of the Moscow Center of WANO, the registration number R21-2016.

To ensure proper response, the Armenian NPP ERS is provided with the required material and technical means and support, and also with the emergency equipment and special premises.

The special premises are assigned which could be used at various stages of emergency response, such as:

- Emergency control board for the MCR operating personnel;
- Crisis center;
- Reserve crisis center;
- Shelters;
- ERS property warehouse.

There are special systems and channels of emergency and regular communication and notification developed and implemented at Armenian NPP.

Personnel training, exercises and drills

Armenian NPP organizes systematic training under the relevant programs and in accordance with the approved schedules.

The topics of the emergency preparedness and response are annually included into the topical plans of the initial briefings for the personnel of structural units.

The issues of the emergency preparedness and response are included in the examination questionnaires of the Armenian NPP personnel.

The skills on appropriate emergency response are maintained through periodical exercises and drills which follow specially prepared scenario and involve all officials who are responsible for critical emergency response objectives.

The exercises and drills are systematically assessed, and based on the results a plan of correcting measures is developed. Their timely and proper implementation is followed-up.

Notification

The Instruction on "Organization of notification and communication in case of emergency situations at the Armenian NPP" establishes the procedure of organizing notification and communication of information from the moment when "Preparedness", "Local accident" and "General accident" situations are declared at Armenian NPP.

The notification is organized according to the Notification Scheme provided in Annex 8.

The permanent duty in the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) of MES ensures prompt response to emergency situations.

On-Site Emergency Response Plan

The on-site plan of Armenian NPP is the principal document that establishes organization and procedure of responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies at Armenian NPP, settles down relations of entities involved in the emergency activities.

The "Plan on Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies at Armenian NPP" (on-site plan) is reviewed with respect to the requirements established in the IAEA document "Methodology of Developing Activities in Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Situations" (EPR – methodology - 2003). The Armenian NPP on-site plan was reviewed and implemented.

The emergency classification consists of 3 classes of emergency which are: General emergency, Site area emergency and Alert. The emergency classification criteria were justified through analytical calculations. There were developed criteria for emergency classification applicable for different conditions at Armenian NPP: power operation, hot shutdown, cooldown, cold state and refueling.

The "classification" considers various types of man-made accidents, natural disasters and illegal human actions that can lead to a nuclear or radiation emergency.

Regulatory review and control activities

ANRA conducted inspections to verify the implementation of the Armenian NPP on-site plan as it is provided for in the license terms and conditions. The following issues have been inspected:

- Armenian NPP on-site plan;
- Armenian NPP personnel evacuation plan;
- Organization of medical protection of the Armenian NPP personnel during emergency situations;
- Organization and implementation of emergency and rescue works during emergency situations;
- Organization of communication and notification during emergency situations;
- Instruction on organization of evacuation measures during emergency situations;
- Instruction for technical support group;
- Radiation monitoring program during nuclear and radiation emergencies;
- Manual on classification of emergency situations at the Armenian NPP;
- Armenian NPP personnel and management preparedness programs;
- Training methodology and its implementation;
- Shelters, located at the Armenian NPP site and their habitability;
- Organization of iodine prophylactic and distribution.

The requirements specified in the ANRA's act-enforcement issued as a result of inspection are in process of implementation.

At ANRA's request, the number of annual exercises at Armenian NPP has been increased.

ANRA resident inspector takes part in the exercises and prepares act or act-enforcement. One of the duties of the resident inspector is to verify the availability and condition of shelters and other emergency preparedness facilities.

11.2 INFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC AND NEIGHBORING STATES

The responsibilities for notification about nuclear and radiological emergencies at Armenian NPP are established in the Basic Requirements to Planning and Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies and in the emergency response plans.

According to the above mentioned regulation, the responsibilities for notification rest with:

- Armenian NPP notification of the population residing in the preventive actions zone (PAZ);
- MIA notification of the population residing in the urgent protective actions zone (UPZ), and if necessary also the population of other settlements;
- ANRA international notification about nuclear and radiation emergencies at Armenian NPP, and receiving information about emergencies occurred in nuclear installations of other countries through the IAEA ERC.

According to the requirements of the RA administrative and regulatory documentation and the National Plan on Population Protection, Armenian NPP is responsible for informing population in PAZ (PAZ – 5km area around the Armenian NPP). The notification system for the protective action zone has been fully restored and is being operated (5km area around the ANPP - Metsamor city, Maisyan village, Aknalich village, Arshaluys village, Ferik village, Nor Yedesia village). A schedule for testing the notification system has been developed. The alert system is also tested during training and exercises.

The notification of the population outside PAZ and the mass media is made by the RA MES. If necessary, the coordinator on relations with mass media and public, jointly with ESC representatives prepare relevant and timely information for mass media about an accident, in order to provide correct and complete information on required protective actions and further progress.

Such information is distributed in the form of Public address system (loudspeakers), information cards, news releases, information messages on official web pages of the response organizations, local radio and television, mobile operators' short messages, and also in the form of briefings and press conferences.

The Republic of Armenia is a party to a number of international treaties and conventions on emergency response and planning (Annex 1).

The Republic of Armenia participates in the IAEA Convex exercises organized in accordance with the IAEA annual schedule.

The Armenian organizations and authorities cooperate with the IAEA (in frame of technical cooperation projects), USA, and EC on different issues related to the emergency response and planning.

RA MES has a separate cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia. It is expected to achieve similar cooperation with Iran. Cooperation is also carried out with member states in the organization of the Collective Security Treaty.

12 NPP SITING

Article 17 Siting

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are established and implemented:

- (i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its projected lifetime;
- (ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and the environment;
- (iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;
- (iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear installation.

12.1 EVALUATION OF SITE RELATED FACTORS

The site selection of the Armenian NPP was started in 1968 in accordance with the normative documents existing at that period. Thus, practically the siting factors which can impact the NPP safety were taken into account:

- NPP site is located on solid rock and basalt area:
- Geological conditions of the site are stable and acceptable;
- Ground waters are deposited on the depth 85-90m;
- Volcanic hazard of the site is extremely low;
- Other natural events (flooding, tornado, landslides and so on) on the territory of the site are not observed.

Then, additional activities related to the site factor have been performed in accordance with:

- Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes;
- Law of the RA on Licensing;
- RA Government Decree № 609-N as of May 12, 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and licence form for site selection of nuclear installations;
- RA Government Decree № 708-N as of July 04, 2013 on approval of the Site Safety Requirements to New NPP Unit(s);
- IAEA Safety Standards.

The objective of the RA Government Decree № 708-N is to establish the requirements to NPP Unit(s) site to characterize the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of the installation.

After the Spitak earthquake in December 1988 and during the shutdown period of the plant the implementation of the seismic upgrading programme was continued.

Three important measures were recommended to be fulfilled:

- Verification of the geological stability of the site, (absence of any capable fault that can produce permanent ground displacement phenomena);
- Determination of the severity of seismic ground motion at the site, (seismic design related parameters, such as peak ground acceleration, ground response spectra, duration, time history accelerations, etc.);
- Establishment and development a complete programme for the re-evaluation of the seismic capacity of buildings, systems and components important to safety in accordance with new data, methods and criteria recognized in the international practice.

The seismic safety related issues of the Armenian NPP unit №2 are specified in the special program on the Armenian NPP Unit №2 seismic safety re-evaluation and improvement, where complex measures of analytical and engineering and technical nature and also the deadlines for their implementations are specified. In the first place, the systems, structures and components for the safe shutdown of the plant should be strengthened.

ANRA has approved the Armenian NPP Unit №2 seismic safety re-evaluation and improvement program that envisages implementation of comprehensive measures of analytical, engineering-technical nature and implementation of modifications with the purpose to improve the seismic safety level of the Armenian NPP unit №2. ANRA regulates also the seismic safety related issues of the dry spent fuel storage facility.

The assessment of external events impact on Armenian NPP safety was performed in frame of the PSA. Selection of external events important to the Armenian NPP site was made on the first stage of assessment. As a result, the following external events have been selected:

- Snow load;
- Wind load:
- Dust storm:
- Flooding due to accumulation of rain water;
- Explosion of pressure tanks;
- Extremely low temperature of air;
- Extremely high temperature of air;
- Aircraft crash.

Detailed analysis was performed for each of the selected events. The analysis demonstrated that the majority of selected initiating events with 10^{-6} [1/year] frequency do not result in damage of the systems, structures and components important to safety.

Currently, ANRA is reviewing the RA Government Decree № 609-N as of May 12, 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and licence form for site selection of nuclear installations and the RA Government Decree № 708-N as of July 04, 2013 on approval of the Site Safety Requirements to New NPP Unit(s) documents, taking into account the IAEA safety standards, WENRA Reference Level, as well as taking into account the features of the SMR.

In 2015 ANRA requested Armenian NPP to increase the level of maximum design basis accident with the equivalent diameter 200mm coolant leak in any point of the MCP. The Armenian NPP plans to implement the ANRA's requirement in the framework of activities on preparation of the Unit №2 for the extended operation.

12.2 IMPACT OF THE INSTALLATION ON INDIVIDUALS, SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT

Radiation Safety Norms and Rules were developed by ANRA and approved by the RA Government (see Annex 2) in 2006. Radiation Safety Norms and Rules define the radiation protection principles, establish the dose limits for categories of personnel in normal and accident conditions, and establish the requirements for exposure of members of the public to man-made sources under normal conditions and due to natural radiation sources. Radiation Safety Norms and Rules were developed in conformity with the international practice and the IAEA recommendations.

The environmental radiation impact of Armenian NPP is controlled by the NPP laboratory of external irradiation control. Within the Armenian NPP supervised area the control is established over the radioisotopes contents in the air, fallouts, underground waters, soil, greens, and also in several types of foods (meat, fish, milk, vegetables, fruits and so on). The radioisotopes contents in the underground waters nourishing the Aknalich Lake, Sevjur river and other nearest water objects is controlled by sampling from bore holes.

The maximum design basis accident was originally the primary leak with 32 mm equivalent diameter. ANRA required increasing of the maximum design basis accident and making relevant modifications aimed to improve the NPP safety level. Armenian NPP has started to implement ANRA's requirement. Activities to extend the maximum design basis accident LOCA 100 and break of pressurizer surge line are implemented in the frame of the LTE. For safety justification of above-mentioned modernizations Armenian NPP performed analysis of radiological consequences for LOCA accidents as well as for beyond design base accidents. The analysis results demonstrated that the population dose loads do not exceed the radiological criteria established by the regulator. Currently in the frame of LTE-2 Armenian NPP has started to activities to extend the maximum design basis accident LOCA.

Armenian NPP in cooperation with the US DOE performs analysis of radiological consequences for selected initiating events. The analysis of radiological consequences were performed for design and beyond design accidents. The analysis results demonstrated that the population dose loads do not exceed the radiation safety norms adopted in the RA. In framework of the spray system modernization, new radiological consequences analysis were performed for DBA and BDBA using new radiological consequence analysis methodology approved by the Government of RA. The analysis results demonstrated that the population dose loads do not exceed the radiation safety norms adopted in the RA for DBAs.

The monitoring of the Armenian NPP impact on environment and population in the Armenian NPP supervised area is performed by the Armenian NPP personnel, and the associated reports are submitted to ANRA on monthly and annual basis. ANRA evaluates the reports and prepares monthly reports and annual reports to the RA Government. The analysis of environmental monitoring results and the evaluation of population exposure dose origination through food chain show that the exposure dose incurred by the population residing around Armenian NPP was significantly lower than the dose limit mentioned in the section 10 of this report.

12.3 RE-EVALUATION OF SITE RELATED FACTORS

The measures on re-evaluation of the site related factors are aimed at ensuring continuous acceptability of the nuclear installation safety.

In 2012-2013 stress test was performed at Armenian NPP.

PGA=0,35g for RLE was kept as the design basis earthquake, and PGA=0,47g was established for the beyond design basis earthquake (BDBE) which corresponded to 10⁻⁵ annual probability on the median curve of seismic hazard.

According to the stress tests philosophy the list of SSC in the SSEL was extended with inclusion of the dry spent fuel storage facility, auxiliary building, ventilation stack, room of inlet water tank №2, the Armenian NPP Unit №1 spent fuel storage pool; and additional calculations of the boundary seismic stability of the mentioned buildings were made.

Based on the results of the implemented analyses, the pipelines and some components of the Unit №1 storage pool were reinforced; hydrants were installed on the demineralized water storage tanks. The opening of 0,5m height and 50m length was arranged on the lower level of the wall of outlet channel water scoop to prevent flooding of the RDGS structures.

It was confirmed that Armenian NPP Unit №2 corresponds to the design basis earthquake (PGA=0,35g), and the earthquake level (PGA=0,42g) was specified which the plant can withstand without the core damage and severe accidents.

Based on the stress tests results and in order to identify the components and systems, which require further modifications, the Armenian NPP was recommended to implement the seismic probabilistic safety analysis.

Also, it was recommended to implement the seismic margin assessment for the fire extinguishing system and install additional fuel tank for filling the DG reserve tanks. These measures implemented to fulfill the Stress Tests Recommendations.

Results of recent reassessment activities

According to the recommendations of the EC PRT, made during the peer review of the national report on stress test for the Armenian NPP, an assessment of the seismic resistance was made for the DGS buildings and the fire station in case of an earthquake with PGA=0.42g. Based on which the design documentation for the seismic reinforcement of three sections of the DGS was developed. In 2023, this reinforcement was carried out, resulting in a DGS HCLPF (High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure) value of 0.7g.

The national report on stress test for Armenian NPP indicates that in the event of a complete blackout, the diesel fuel available in the DGS compartments (reserve tank of 25 m³, service tank of 3 m³) provides power at full load for 30 hours (instead of the required 72 hours).

Taking into account the fact that the reserve tanks in the compartments of the DGS building, the volume of which is 25 m³, have the possibility of topping up diesel fuel through the top hatch, it was assumed that it would be sufficient to increase the seismic resistance of the existing diesel fuel reserve tanks by 200 m³ and 300 m³ (B15,16), which are located on the site (using them as diesel fuel storage tanks), providing the possibility of using diesel fuel from these tanks after RLE by mobile means.

Based on the abovementioned, the foundations of both tanks B15, B16 were reinforced and the pipelines were installed on both tanks facing the road, making it possible, after an earthquake, to deliver fuel to the reserve tanks in the compartments of the DGS building.

The analytical justification of tanks B15, B16 seismic resistance at RLE (PGA=0.35g) have also been performed. Tanks B15 and B16 were included in SSEL-2. As part of the seismic walkdown conducted in 2024, these tanks were reviewed and corresponding attestation sheets were prepared, stating that the implemented seismic reinforcements meet current standards. However, in order to determine the achieved level of seismic resistance (PGA > 0.42g), a HCLPF calculation must be performed.

The HCLPF calculation for tanks B15 and B16, as well as for their pipelines, pumps, electrical equipment, and associated buildings, is included in the technical specifications currently under development (see below).

As a result of the stress test, it was recommended to perform an assessment of the seismic resistance of the fire extinguishing system. The evaluation of the boundary seismic resistance of 483 elements of the fire-fighting system equipment and pipelines for the seismic impact with PGA=0.42g has been completed. The results showed that the main part of the equipment and pipelines of this system is seismic resistant, 451 elements were assessed as seismically qualified.

For 27 elements, according to the recommendations issued, seismic reinforcement measures have been developed, which are implemented in stages; the main part of these measures has been completed. It is scheduled to complete the implementation of the seismic reinforcement measures by the end of 2023.

The program titled "Seismic Safety Assessment of Unit 2 of the Armenian NPP under a Refined Earthquake Level with PGA = 0.42g" has been approved, with its implementation scheduled through the end of 2026.

Within the framework of the above program, the floor response spectra (FRS) were obtained for the main building and DGS during an earthquake with PGA=0.42g.

List of Safety-Related Systems and Components (SSC) subject to reassessment for an earthquake with PGA = 0.42g was developed. This list is provisionally referred to as "SSEL-2".

In 2024, during the scheduled preventive maintenance, the Russian company CBTI "Vibroseism" conducted a detailed seismic walkdown. All elements included in "SSEL-2" were reviewed, and Seismic Walkdown Evaluation Sheets (SWES) were completed for 1809 equipment items. As a result, out of the 30 systems included in "SSEL-2", 22 systems were identified as seismically resistant under the refined seismic hazard level with PGA=0.42g. A separate list was also developed for the equipment of Unit 2 of the Armenian NPP that requires additional measures.

These measures are categorized by complexity into three groups:

- Group A "easy fix" easily implemented reinforcements;
- Group B replacement or development of new design solutions;
- Group C additional analyses/calculations are required to determine HCLPF (High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure)

The measures for Groups A and B will be implemented by the Armenian NPP according to a separate schedule. For Group C, technical specifications are currently being developed to carry out the necessary HCLPF analyses and calculations.

In 2024, two systems were put into pilot operation:

- Seismic Monitoring System for the Reactor Unit (SMS RU);
- Seismic Monitoring System for the Main Building (SMS MB).

Currently, the necessary operational documentation is being developed, after which the abovementioned systems will be commissioned.

From July 10 to 18, 2024, an IAEA expert mission visited the Armenian NPP. During the mission, the following topics were reviewed:

• The program "Seismic Safety Assessment of Unit 2 of ANPP under a refined earthquake level with a PGA=0.42g";

- The Safe Shutdown Equipment List of Unit 2 of ANPP (SSEL-2);
- Floor Response Spectra of Unit 2 of ANPP under an earthquake with a PGA=0.42g;
- Seismic Monitoring System for the Reactor Unit (SMS RU);
- Seismic Monitoring System for the Main Building (SMS MB).

The experts conducted walkdowns, including in the controlled access area (CAA), to review the implemented seismic reinforcement measures.

The experts provided the ANPP the IAEA Mission Report, which included their recommendations. Technical specifications are currently being developed to implement these recommendations.

In the third quarter of 2025, technical specifications will be prepared based on the aforementioned CBTI "Vibroseism" documents and the IAEA experts' recommendations for the completion of the remaining tasks related to the seismic resistance assessment of HCLPF of Unit 2. This will allow for the full completion of the program "Seismic Safety Assessment of Unit 2 of the NPP under a Refined Earthquake Level with a PGA=0.42g."

In 2016 the European Commission (EC), European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) experts jointly with Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), performed a Peer Review of the stress test and recommended, for volcanic events, to determine, at a minimum, the plant's resistance to impact of tephra fallout and missiles.

A probabilistic assessment of the volcanic phenomena impact on the ANPP Unit 2 was carried out. Based on the calculation results, the probable impact of each volcanic event on reactor core damage was determined. The overall frequency of core damage due to volcanic events is 8.176E-07 [1/year].

In 2023, a seismic PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) was conducted by the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Scientific and Technical Center (NRSC).

The total seismic Core Damage Frequency (CDF) was estimated at 9.12E-06 events per year.

The IAEA experts visited the ANPP from 10 to 18 July 2024. The following issues were considered during the Mission.

- The program "Assessment of seismic safety of the ANPP Unit No.2 during an earthquake of a specified level with PGA=0.42g";
- The list of equipment for the safe shutdown of ANPP Unit No.2 (LESS-2);
- Floor response spectra of the ANPP power Unit No.2 during an earthquake with a PGA of 0.42g;
- The seismic monitoring system for reactor installations (SMS RI);
- The seismic monitoring system of the main building (SMS MB).

In 2024, two systems were put into trial operation:

- The seismic monitoring system of reactor installation (SMS RI);
- The seismic monitoring system of the main building (SMS MB).

Currently, the necessary operational documentation is being developed, after which the above-mentioned systems will be put into full operation.

12.4 CONSULTATION WITH OTHER CONTRACTING PARTIES LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE INSTALLATION

The list of international treaties ratified by the Republic of Armenia is provided in Annex 1 of this report.

On 2015 December 24, the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Memorandum of Understanding. In the frame of that Memorandum are established the working group for coordination the cooperation on nuclear energy between Parties, as well as for exchange of information.

The Republic of Armenia has no bilateral arrangements with the neighboring states.

13 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18. Design and Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

- (i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;
- (ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;
- (iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.

13.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH

In Armenia the main legal acts settling the relations concerned with response to nuclear and radiological emergencies are:

- Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes;
- General Regulations On Ensuring Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, OPB -88/97;
- RA Government Decree № 1411-N as of November 08, 2012 on approval of the Design Safety Requirements to New NPP Unit(s).

The content of the RA Government Decree № 1411-N includes:

- Safety goals;
- NPP main safety requirements;
- Proved engineering and technical practice;
- Safety assessments;
- Classification of safety equipment;
- Requirements to SSC safety.

ANRA and NRSC revised Design Safety Requirements to New NPP Unit(s) and Site Evaluation Requirements to New NPP Unit(s). The objective for the revision was to bring the legal acts to the conformity with the latest IAEA requirements and to consider the peculiarities of the SMRs as an option for the new NPP construction in Armenia.

NRSC conducted multiple investigations for the assessment of SMR technologies in terms of their deployment in Armenia, including study of their expediency and feasibility.

The Armenian NPP design was developed with respect to the defense-in-depth principle. In accordance with this principle the Armenian NPP design includes five levels of defense and four main barriers to prevent release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.

All five levels of the defense in depth are implemented at Armenian NPP. The safety deficiencies related to the implementation of defense levels are documented and the upgrading measures are planned in the Comprehensive Safety Upgrading Programme.

The many years' experience of successful operation of WWER-440 reactors demonstrated the validity and reliability of the accepted design solutions. The positive features of WWER-440 reactor facility are: comparatively low power rating of the core, availability of specific volume of the primary coolant and cooling water reserve in the SGs of the secondary side and features of the primary side contributing to the coolant natural circulation that enables the passive core cooling in the natural circulation modes during accidents for a long time and reduces dependency on earlier operator actions.

At designing of Armenian NPP that was supposed to be operated in the seismic area it was accepted that systems, structures and components ensuring the safety of personnel and population and also protection of the environment against contamination above the allowable limits should remain operable to certain degree at any seismic impacts possible at the NPP site.

To prevent escalation of design bases accident into beyond design basis accident and also to reduce radiological consequences at beyond design accidents the following upgrades have been implemented at the Armenian NPP:

- Upgrade of the primary circuit protection system against pressure rise. In particular, installation of the PRZ impulse safety valves certified to be operated in water media;
- Upgrade of the secondary circuit protection system against pressure rise. In particular, installation of the SG impulse safety valves certified to be operated in water media;
- Upgrade of the steamline system. In particular, installation of fast acting valves;
- Upgrade of the automatic DG start-up system after modernization of ECCS and spry system. This upgrade enables actuation of two high pressure and one low pressure pumps in each safety channel of the emergency core cooling system and two pumps in each channel of the spray system at the total power loss at the Armenian NPP;
- Implementation of a completely independent essential service water system;
- Upgrade of the emergency core cooling system actuation logic;
- The system for additional make-up of SG with installation of diesel pump was implemented;
- Partial separation of the electric power supply and I&C channels;
- Implementation of the system for the reactor pressure vessel protection against cold overpressurisation;
- Implementation of the Leak Before Break concept and installation of the leak detection systems;
- Assessment of the high energy piping and implementation of associated measures;
- Installation of filters against clogging of the confinement sump;
- MCR habitability improvement;

- Establishment of the emergency control room with installation of the post-accident monitoring system and the backup control panel;
- Installation of restraints against pipe whip on the main steamlines;
- Separation of the reactor protection system into two independent channels(by technological parameters);
- Replacement of the industrial seismic protection system (ISPS);
- Replacement/modernization of uninterruptible power supply system (replacement of accumulator batteries, replacement of reversible diesel generators, replacement of thyristor transducers);
- Replacement/modernization of electric equipment of the reactor protection and control system;
- Replacement/modernization of generator system (with replacement of generators, dismantling of auxiliary generator and implementation of thyristor excitation system);
- Recovery of the software for information and computation system (ICS), in-core monitoring technological system (ICMTS);
- Modification of the emergency core cooling system;
- Modification of spray system;
- Enhancement of confinement leaktightness;
- Modification of reliable electric power supply system replacement of II category electric power supply system 6kV and 0,4kV switchers.
- Replacement of rely system to electronic system of electric generator house transformer protection unit.
- Modification of sealings of main connectors of pressurizer, steam generator and main coolant pump replacement of metallic sealings to graphite.
- Modification of control system of steam turbine.

Armenian NPP is finalizing the implementation of the ANRA's requirement made in 2015 to increase the maximum design basis accident up to the pressurizer surge line break (2x209mm) and break on the cold leg with the equivalent diameter of 100 mm. It includes modernization of the spray system (separate systems into two independent channels) and the ECCS (installation of two independent channels of the low-pressure injection system). Currently in the frame of LTE-2 Armenian NPP has started to activities to extend the maximum design basis accident LOCA 200.

The following upgrades are planned to be implemented:

- Implementation of passive autocatalytic recombiners to prevent accumulation of explosive hydrogen concentration in the confinement;
- Implementation the reactor undercover gas removal system;
- Implementation of the system for isolating the reactor undercover from the ventilation system in case of leaks in the undercover.

In addition, several safety upgrades have been recommended to the Armenian NPP based on the comprehensive safety assessment project implemented by the international consortium in co-operation with the IAEA. Based on the results of the performed comprehensive safety analysis the list of safety upgrades for the Armenian NPP Unit №2 had been revised.

Based on the results of the self-assessment report of the Armenian NPP and the conclusions made by the EC peer review team after reviewing the national stress test report of the Armenian NPP, ANRA developed a National Action Plan for 2026. The action plan is currently in the implementation stage.

Since 2018, the Armenian NPP with the technical support of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center, implements measures to improve the equipment qualification system and verify the qualification status of the equipment in operation at the Armenian NPP Unit No2 based on the equipment qualification requirements established under the order of the ANRA Chairman.

ANPP developed symptom-oriented EOP and SAMG which include power and shutdown conditions. The developed EOP and SAMG are in the process of revision based on independent review.

ANRA implements regulatory control through the regular inspections in accordance with its annual schedule.

13.2 INCORPORATION OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGIES

According to the paragraph 1.2.5 of the General Safety Regulations (OPB -88/97) "Technical and administrative decisions made to ensure NPP safety shall be well proven by the previous experience or tests, investigations, operating experience of prototypes and shall meet requirements of regulatory documents. Such approach shall be applied not only in development of equipment and design of the NPP but also in manufacture of equipment, construction and operation of the NPP, its backfitting and reconditioning of its systems (elements)".

According to the paragraph 3.1 of the RA Government Decree № 1411-N "The first level of defense requires the prevention of transients, accidents and other deviations from normal operation. The plant must be designed, constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with high levels of quality and proven engineering practices, selection and application of appropriate design codes and materials".

The recommendations of IAEA and WENRA were taken into account during development of the document, and the relevant documents were also studied.

The description of review and control activities of ANRA is provided in detail in the section 9.1 of this report.

In implementation of modifications Armenian NPP applies only the systems and equipment with proven operation at any of the world NPPs.

Implementation of modification projects upgrades the reliability of equipment operation.

Obsolete analogue information and control systems are replaced by new digital components, in particular, in the framework of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 long-term operation programs the following activities are implemented:

- Replacement of complete electric equipment of the Control and Protection System with new digital equipment manufactured by SKODA, which passed test operation and showed successful results at Hungarian, Czech, and Slovakian NPPs;
- Replacement of MCR complete I&C in total 230 pcs. with digital one as a set with sensors. The types of instrumentation for replacement are successfully operated at Russian and Ukrainian NPPs;
- Modification of automatic control system along with replacement of all analogue systems with digital ones which passed test at Russian NPPs.

13.3 DESIGN FOR RELIABLE, STABLE AND MANAGEABLE OPERATION

Armenian NPP is operated in accordance with the Technical Specification. The reliability of operation is provided through regular inspections, maintenance, testing and repair of the NPP technological systems having impact on safety. The information on verification of performance of safety important systems is provided to ANRA.

The impact of human factor on safe operation is described in detail in the section 7 of this report. The quantitative assessment of human factor impact on safety was made in frame of PSA.

ANRA conducts regular inspections in accordance with the schedule to ensure regulator control over implementation of the safe operation requirements.

The description of the regulatory review and control activities is provided in detail in the section 9.1 of this report.

14 OPERATION

Article 19 Operation

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

- (i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
- (ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation;
- (iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with approved procedures;
- (iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents;
- (v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;
- (vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the regulatory body;
- (vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies and with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;
- (viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.

14.1 INITIAL AUTHORIZATION

The analysis of the design safety was performed in 1995 before Armenian NPP Unit №2 restart in accordance with the NPP restart concept.

The following analyses with application of the deterministic approach have been performed:

- "Complex analysis of NPP design safety level based on deterministic and probabilistic approaches" Atomenergoproekt, 1994;
- "Report on thermal hydraulic calculations to justify design operation conditions of Armenian NPP unit №2". Gidropress, 1995;
- "Final safety analysis report of Armenian NPP" Framatom, 1992;
- "Report of Bechtel Corporation specialists";
- "Analysis of working conditions, materials and radiation resource of Armenian NPP Unit №2 reactor vessel". Gidropress, 1995;
- "Re-evaluation of Armenian NPP seismic conditions", 1995.

Based on the safety analysis ANRA issued annual permits for operation. Then, ANRA developed the requirements to the SAR (RA Government Decree № 2013-N as of 21.11.2002), based on which the operating organization prepared the documents for obtaining the operational license in accordance with the RA Government Decree № 400-N as of 24.03.2005 on approval of the procedure and licence form for operation of nuclear installations.

The following documents have been developed and enforced by ANRA, in support to LTO project:

- Requirements for the form and content of the Comprehensive Survey Report (ANRA order № 9-N as of 2016);
- The methodology for analyzing the deviations in the NPP unit design and in the existing condition from the requirements of the legal acts in the field of atomic energy use (ANRA order № 98-A as of 2016);
- Requirements for aging management of systems, structures and components important to safety of NPP (ANRA order № 125-A as of 2017);
- Requirements to Equipment Qualification (ANRA order № 126-A as of 2017).
- Requirements to maintenance effectiveness monitoring process (ANRA order №127-A as of 2017).

14.2 OPERATIONAL LIMITS AND CONDITIONS

The operational limits and conditions of Armenian NPP are brought in compliance with the technical standards set in the Armenian NPP design. The set of safe and normal operation limits and conditions is specified in the Technical Specification for operation of Armenian NPP unit №2 with WWER-440 (V-270) type reactor. ANRA verifies the safety management, maintenance and repair and control through inspections.

The radiation protection and safety limits and conditions are specified in the Technical Specification on Radiation Monitoring and provided in the section 10 and in Annex 6 of this report.

The working places of personnel involved in the implementation of safety measures are provided with the documents required for safe implementation of technological process in compliance with the established limits and conditions.

Training and examination of personnel involved in the implementation of safety measures are performed in compliance with the requirements of existing standards and regulations.

The operating limits and conditions are reviewed, as appropriate, in the established order in compliance with the requirements of regulatory documents, and also during assembly, modernization, and reconstruction activities.

The operating limits and conditions have been reviewed in the frame of the LTO project of the Armenian NPP Unit №2; the safe operation of the Armenian NPP Unit №2 for the next 10 years was justified.

14.3 PROCEDURES FOR OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, INSPECTION AND TESTING

The operation, maintenance, inspection and testing procedures established at Armenian NPP with respect to the requirements of the rules and standards, are revised in accordance with the established frequency as well as implementation of modifications, upgrades and operational experience feedback.

Through inspections and tests, maintenance and repair, the safety systems are maintained in operable condition to fulfill functions attributed by the design. In compliance with the administrative management procedures the operating personnel is provided with all the required documentation, procedures at their work places and receives training according to the training program.

A complete set of operational documents for Armenian NPP systems and equipment is developed for improvement of the Armenian NPP operational safety. The complete set of operational and technical documentation includes normal operating procedures, technical descriptions, emergency response procedures and programs for checking operability and testing. Armenian NPP has established a procedure for amending and revising the administrative and operating procedures. Before implementation the complete set of operational and technical documentation is verified and validated by the relevant Armenian NPP personnel having relevant work experience and qualification.

The responsibility has been defined for completeness and safety of the complete set of operating procedures available at the work places of the operating personnel according to the approved distribution list. The copies of the complete set of operating procedures available at work places of Armenian NPP personnel are intended for information, training and drills. The administrative and operating procedures are revised according to the procedure established at Armenian NPP.

The operation, maintenance, inspection and testing procedures established at Armenian NPP with respect to the requirements of the rules and standards, are revised in the established frequency as well as with the implementation of modifications, upgrades and operational experience feedback.

Armenian NPP developed symptom-oriented EOP and SAMG which include power and shutdown conditions based on the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines (WOG ERG) is in process. The project is supported by the US Department of Energy with Pacific North National Laboratories and Argonne National Laboratories. The developed EOP and SAMG are in the revision process based on independent review.

The maintenance and testing procedures developed by Armenian NPP are agreed with ANRA. The results of testing of the safety systems are submitted to ANRA in a due frequency as established in the requirements.

14.4 PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES AND ACCIDENTS

The safety systems through inspections and tests, maintenance and repair are maintained in operable condition which is a guarantee of implementation of the safety functions. The operating personnel, in compliance with the procedures of administrative management are provided with all the necessary documents, procedures in their work places and are trained according to training programme.

The procedures for the Armenian NPP personnel response, protection, organization and implementation of the emergency radiation monitoring in case of operational events and accidents are defined in the Armenian NPP on-site plan which are periodically tested during exercises and drills organized at the Armenian NPP on a regular basis.

Development of event-oriented and/or symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures

New symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures for reactor shutdown condition, for reactor full power operation and for the spent fuel storage pools of the Armenian NPP Unit №1 and Unit №2 (SOEOPs) are developed to replace old EOPs within the framework of US DOE with Pacific North National Laboratories and Argonne Laboratory assistance project for Armenian NPP.

The schedule for implementation of SOEOPs was developed for the reactor power operation condition, for the shutdown reactor and for the EPP of the cooling pools of the Armenian NPP Unit N1 and Unit N2.

All packages have been independently reviewed and are being modified based on the review results.

SOEOPs for the Armenian NPP take into account:

- Upgrades implemented at the Armenian NPP;
- Accidents or incidents that occur during shutdown and start-up;
- Aspect of elimination of emergency consequences;
- Reactor shutdown condition, in which the containment and reactor pressure vessel are open and there are no physical barriers between the fuel assemblies and the environment;
- Accidents occurring in the spent fuel pool of the Unit №1 and Unit №2;
- The aspect of reactor cooling, if evacuation from the control room is required in case of an accident.

Certain procedures at Armenian NPP were revised with regard to results of the stress test of the Armenian NPP.

Development of severe accident management guidelines

Within the framework of US DOE and Argonne Laboratory assistance project for Armenian NPP SAMG, the SAMGs are developed by the "Armatom" Institute.

The approach for establishing the SAMG is based on the Westinghouse generic guidelines. The newly developed SAMGs are in the process of revision based on independent review. The schedule on implementation of SAMGs has been developed.

14.5 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The functions of operating organization are entrusted to the Armenian NPP.

The engineering support to the Armenian NPP operation implies implementation of the plant effective activity in the areas of:

- Documentation (OTD, ATD, STD) control and management;
- Engineering provision of modernizations (modifications) and control of the systems and equipment configuration;
- Planning of operation activities;

- Efficiency control of the ANPP activity;
- Check and test programs;
- Core management;
- Fuel management;
- Computer-aided systems important to safety;
- Information support to the Armenian NPP subdivisions and external organizations.

The following departments have been established within the structure of the plant to provide with the internal technical support relative to the safety improvement:

- Nuclear safety and reliability department;
- Engineering and technical support department;
- Radiation protection department;
- Workshop for thermal automatics and measurement;
- Seismic safety department;
- Technical department of planning and operation;
- Technical inspection;
- Buildings and structures maintenance department;
- Operating experience department;
- Life time extension and ageing management department.

Besides there are also external technical support organizations in Armenia, in particular:

- "Armatom" CJS:
- "Atomservice" CJS;
- "Teckhnatomenergo" CJS.

The technical support is received also from foreign organizations in frame of international assistance programs (IAEA, EC, USA). On-site assistance project is implemented at the Armenian NPP over the last 20 years.

The responsibility for coordination of activities with the external support organizations in Armenia rests with the operating organization.

The engineering and technical support is provided mainly for the safety upgrades of Armenian NPP that cover all safety aspects.

14.6 REPORTING OF INCIDENTS SIGNIFICANT TO SAFETY

In accordance with the Article 20 of the Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes the operating organization should investigate accidents and incidents occurred during operation of nuclear installations. In accordance with the General Safety Regulations, the operating organization should provide ANRA with information on operational events in the established order. The criteria for selection of events to be reported to the regulatory authority, are described in the procedure on investigation of NPP operational events approved under the RA Government Decree № 418-N as of 05.04.2012. The

procedure covers issues related to notification, account, investigation and reports on operational events occurred at the NPP and establishes:

- Categories of operational events;
- Procedure of accounting and notification of events;
- Procedure on investigation of events.

Events, detected during implementation of operational and maintenance activities, walkdowns, inspections, audits etc. at Armenian NPP should be reported. Any unfavorable, unforeseen action that resulted in deviation from the established requirements and standards should be also reported to ANRA. Events to be reported to ANRA are classified by the INES scale in accordance with the "International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)", 2008 Edition. At ANRA' request the assigned event level can be changed.

In accordance with the established procedure a preliminary event report is prepared within 24 hours after an operational event is detected and sent to ANRA. A 15-days period is specified to investigate causes of the event and to submit the event investigation report to ANRA.

The reports on investigation of operational events are analyzed by ANRA. If a root cause is not detected or corrective measures do not fully cover and prevent reoccurrence of event ANRA may require additional investigation. ANRA can conduct inspection of corrective measures implemented at Armenian NPP.

ANRA has established a database of operational events. The database contains the following information: date of event, summary description of event, number of report on investigation, description of direct and root cause, corrective measures and deadlines for implementation, as well as electronic version of complete report on investigation.

The information to the International Reporting System (IRS) is regularly provided. Data from the IRS database are analyzed and provided to the concerned authorities for use.

Reports on the events occurred at Armenian NPP is periodically presented to the Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the RA Prime Minister (former the Nuclear Energy Safety Council under the RA President) and to the WANO.

The reporting period 21 events associated with the operation of the plant have been recorded, of which, according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), 17 events have been classified as level "0" (assessed as deviation), and 4 events as level "1" (assessed as anomaly).

The occurred events didn't cause violation of the safe operation limits and conditions. Correcting measures were developed and implemented for all events. Based on the terms and conditions of the operation licence twice a year ANPP reports to ANRA the low level events and near-misses and their evaluation results and corrective measures.

14.7 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK

A formalized program of operational experience (OE) was developed based on the IAEA PROSPER mission recommendations.

The Armenian NPP operational experience department (OED) is responsible for the OE program.

The management policy and expectations have been established for reporting on events (including low-level events with near-misses), threats, errors and organizational deficiencies.

A full set of 20 documents, formalizing the OE complete process, has been developed and implemented.

Training materials on new processes and methods have been elaborated, and the training of both OED personnel (on event review methodologies – ASSET, HPES), and of the rest of the NPP personnel have been performed.

The IAEA safety standards, WANO documentation, good practice of the other NPPs have been used during implementation of the OE program at Armenian NPP.

Review of events occurred at the plant is performed in accordance with the guideline on determination of event direct and root causes.

The event investigation is performed with application of ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events) and HPES (Human Performance Evaluation System) methodologies.

ASSET methodology is applied to investigate the safety important events. HPES methodology, which includes several methods (change review, protective barriers review, task review), is used to review the events, connected with human actions.

A mechanism has been developed and implemented to control the quality of the compiled reports on the events investigation by evaluating the numerical values of various indicators (10 indicators) that describe the organization and conduct of the event investigation.

All reports on events are submitted to ANRA.

The exchange of information about events at the ANPP within the framework of the international events information system at the WANO NPPs is performed on the basis of the obligations of the membership of Armenian NPP to WANO.

Criteria and categories according to the importance of the event have been established for the proper exchange of information, as well as a format for presenting information for the unambiguous interpretation and application of information received by the relevant WANO regional centers. The deadlines for the transmission of information about events are also established (no more than 140 days from the date of the event).

The criteria for evaluation external events by degree of importance of their analysis and application as well as the procedure for development and implementation of corrective measures are established.

Three categories of external events by degree of their importance for the Armenian NPP are established.

1. **High priority:** Armenian NPP management should immediately get familiar with the information. This category is attributed to the information on the events directly affecting nuclear safety, personnel safety and the NPP reliability.

The category is attributed on the basis of one or several of the following features:

- The event is classified as Level 3 or higher by the INES scale;
- The event reporting is of SOER or SER type;
- The event occurred at the NPP with similar design and there is a possibility of its recurrence at the Armenian NPP, if safety measures are not undertaken;
- The event is important and requires particular attention and respective measures to be undertaken from the point of view of ANRA.
- 2. Average priority: the category is attributed if information meets the following criteria:
- The event is classified as Level 1 or 2 by the INES scale;
- Information is of EAR or ENR reporting type.

- 3. For the information: information does not have high or average priority but it meets application criteria and is distributed among the divisions to get familiarized with. Following the assessment of event importance to the Armenian NPP the information is received by respective subdivisions to review and develop proposals on corrective measures. The review is performed based on "How can this event occur at our NPP?" principle. The event review is performed with application of the following approach:
- How could the plant become vulnerable in regard to the event under consideration (why could such an event occur)?
- Are there any barriers designed to prevent such event at the Armenian NPP and what are the additional barriers required?
- Are reported corrective measures acceptable for the Armenian NPP?
- What are the additional corrective measures to be undertaken?

The information on event and undertaken corrective measures are entered into the Event Database. As a rule the corrective measures are registered in an administrative document and they are not limited by implementation of purely technical measures. The lessons learned from external event analysis are also implemented with the following methods:

- Use of information on external events in personnel training;
- Personnel acknowledgement with information about events by means of booklets.

In the framework of co-operation with WANO event (internal and external) information is exchanged within Information Exchange on Operating Experience program.

International organizations WANO and IAEA regularly organize workshops/meetings on operating experience issues presenting important industry events. It is used at these meetings to present lessons learned by Armenian NPP from the occurred important events.

Application of industrial operating experience (except for events) by Armenian NPP operating organization is regulated by the guideline "Use of industry operating experience". A procedure is established for analysis of industry operating experience and its use aimed at Armenian NPP operation safety and reliability upgrading.

The following information sources for industry operating experience are used at Armenian NPP:

- Materials of international workshops, reports of IAEA and WANO missions;
- Information from NPPs and international organizations in the framework of bilateral and international co-operation;
- Information from design organizations and equipment suppliers;
- Materials of meetings (twice per year) of Russia, Armenia and Ukraine NPPs managers;
- Materials of IAEA and WANO workshops.

When considering industry operating experience information the principle of maximum learning is used for the lessons that would allow the plant to avoid problems.

Assessment of information on industry experience includes answers to the following questions:

- What are the lessons that could be learned from information?
- What specific actions shall be undertaken at the Armenian NPP to implement good practice or avoid similar problems?

The analysis results are registered in industry operating experience feedback form including recommendations (lessons learned to implement) to use them at the Armenian NPP.

If a need in additional information arises a corresponding organization is requested.

The plant annually sends hundreds of requests to various organizations (operating organizations, NPPs, design organizations and manufacturers) for information concerning improvement of various activity aspects and experience exchange to solve arising problems.

Good practice of other NPPs is used through acknowledgement with results of past international missions (WANO Peer Reviews and IAEA OSART Missions), and active participation of personnel and management in international meetings and conferences.

Good practice of the plant in various activity areas is learned by international missions invited to the Armenian NPP to carry out Peer Review of activity.

We have close relationships with Russian and Eastern European NPPs which have similar design specifications.

Main experience exchange areas include issues of design safety upgrading and improvement of operational safety. Concerning different implementation stages of their modernization and operational safety programs the experience exchange and learning of lessons is the most effective method to correct programs and implement good practice.

In 2005 the operating organization developed Event Data Base. The existing database was developed in regard to all requirements of IAEA guiding documents in the area of operating experience and best practice of the world's NPPs in that area.

All information on events occurred at the plant is entered into the database.

Each event in the database is specified with a set of more than 40 parameters including equipment safety class, the event impact on the unit operating conditions, event consequences, way of event identification, involved personnel, direct and root causes, correcting actions, INES level, etc.

The event data base was installed in the plant network and allows on-line event reporting by all users, receipt of information about the occurred events, status of investigation, correcting actions, etc.

Use of coding system for event parameters in the database allows performing selection by any event parameters. In addition the database allows receiving more than 85 standard statistic requests, such as:

- Event by failure type;
- Event by direct causes;
- Event by root causes;
- Event by for safety class of the failed equipment;
- By categories of insignificant events;
- By problem of insignificant event.

As of January 1, 2024, the database contains detailed information on more than 31000 plant events, and information on more than 7400 events occurred at other plants worldwide.

The work is currently underway to update the event database software. ANRA reviews and approves licensee programmes and procedures of safety related activities and their changes. ANRA provides inputs to IRS and INES, and also studies inputs made to these information systems by other countries. ANRA also uses the information on operational events received from the WWER Regulators Forum. ANRA also requires Armenian NPP to study the corresponding IRS database reports and to develop corrective

actions, which should be transferred to the Corrective Action Program and the Safety Operation Program that are submitted by Armenian NPP to ANRA twice a year as stipulated in the operating license terms and conditions.

14.8 MANAGEMENT OF SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON THE SITE

The wet storage in Armenian NPP spent fuel pools, handling and transport of the spent nuclear fuel are performed in line with the established national regulations, the adopted Russian Regulatory document on "Rules of safety at storage and transport of nuclear fuel at NPPs", IAEA Specific Safety Guide "Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel" as well as in line with the terms and conditions of the granted licenses. The NUHOMS type horizontal dry spent fuel storage facility located at the Armenian NPP site was licensed according to the US NRC requirements, particularly, 10CFR Part 72 "Licensing requirements for the independent storage of spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and reactor-related greater than class C", "Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities" (NUREG-1567), Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems (NUREG-1536).

Spent fuel assemblies are unloaded into spent fuel pools of Armenian NPP Unit№2 and Unit№1 for precooling for 5-12 years depending on initial U-235 enrichment and discharge burnup.

After reaching the required design acceptance criteria on residual decay heat, neutron and gamma doses, and spent fuel assemblies are stored in the dry spent fuel storage facility.

The dry spent fuel storage facility (DSFS) consists of two extensions:

- The first extension consists of 11 HSM operated from the year 2000 filled completely.
- The first part of the second extension consists of 12 HSM operated since 2008 filled completely.
 The second part of the second extension consists of 12 HSM operated from 2016, and 11 HSM are filled.
- ANPP plans to construct new module with of 12 HSM. It is planned to finish the construction on 2026.

The operation of the dry spent fuel storage facility is implemented in accordance with the operational license granted by ANRA in 2000 (for the first module of the DSFS) and 2008 (for the second and third modules of the DSFS) and a number of relevant on-site procedures and programs such as:

- Program on shipment of transport container/dry shield canister to the dry spent fuel storage facility;
- Loading of spent fuel assembly in the transport cask/dry shield canister;
- Procedure on accounting and control of nuclear fuel at Armenian NPP;
- General procedure on loading of spent nuclear fuel into the dry spent fuel storage facility.

In the Republic of Armenia radioactive waste is generated from the operation of Armenian NPP and from certain applications in medicine, industry, research and other practices. The handling of radioactive waste is performed in line with the established national regulations, international requirements and terms and conditions of the granted licenses. The list of existing legal acts related to the safety of radioactive waste management is provided in Annex 2 of the national report.

The Law on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, adopted on March 01, 1999 by the National Assembly (Parliament) of the Republic of Armenia, is the basic legal document for settling relations in the field of the atomic energy utilization. The definition of radioactive waste is provided in the Article 3 of the mentioned Law, which stipulates: "radioactive waste is a radioactive material or a surface contaminated radioactive material for which no further use is foreseen and which is subject to isolation from the environment".

The RA Government Decree № 631-N as of 04.06.2009 on approval of procedure on radioactive waste management specifies requirements to the radioactive waste management. The last amendment in the document made by the Government Decree № 1324 N as of January 01, 2016 specifies new requirements for the characterization of radioactive waste, waste form and waste package in compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards. In accordance to the mentioned document the radioactive waste is characterized according to the exposure properties, physical and chemical properties and the biological properties. The radioactive waste form and waste package the characterization shall be performed according to their radiation properties, physical and chemical properties.

The Radiation Safety Norms specify also the clearance or conditional clearance levels from regulatory control for moderate and bulk amount of materials. However, no radioactive waste clearance is implemented at Armenian NPP.

The fourth national report of the Republic of Armenia under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Convention) was submitted for the review and discussion to the Contracting Parties pursuant to the Article 30 of the Joint Convention, in August 2024 and contains a more detailed information about the radioactive waste management systems and practices in Armenia.

Then the RA Government on January 10, 2019 adopted the Decree № 3-L on approval of 2019-2026 action plan–schedule on implementation of provisions stipulated in strategy on safe management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in the Republic of Armenia.

The main strategic routes for management of the spent fuel and radioactive waste generated in Armenia are as follows:

- Expanding the existing DSFS facility (dry horizontal storage technology);
- Constructing DSFS facility (vertical storage technology use of dual purpose casks);
- Establishing the centralized radioactive waste management organization (on the basis of Institutional radioactive waste storage facility) for radioactive waste long term-management issues;
- Controlling the generation of radioactive waste;
- Introducing the "polluter pays" principle;
- Enhancing the radioactive waste processing and storage capabilities;
- Taking measures for personnel recruitment/training;
- Implementing activities towards disposal of VLLW, LLW and ILW-SL waste in a near surface formations, considering the opportunity of capacity after the decommissioning of Armenian NPP;
- Implementing R&D on feasibility of radioactive waste disposal in geological formations;
- Developing the electronic database for radioactive waste accounting and control system.

For the implementation of the activities stipulated in the Action Plan, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Armenia, which is the state competent authority, empowered with the radioactive waste management related issues, has established a "Working group".

Management practice of radioactive waste at Armenian NPP site is implemented in compliance with national and international regulations, as well as guides and internal procedures and instructions.

All liquids from Armenian NPP controlled area are collected and evaporated continuously, the result of which is the evaporation concentrate. The low level sorbents tanks at the Armenian NPP are empty due to the continuous evaporation of the accumulated liquids. The generated evaporation concentrate (intermediate level liquid radioactive waste) further undergoes treatment at the deep evaporation facility

(DEF). The produced "salt cake" is packed at the metal containers, solidified there and placed for storage at the temporary storage site dedicated for the DEF containers.

At present, the temporary storage site is full and the intermediate storage facility is used as an interim solution for storing the DEF containers.

Solid radioactive waste generated at Armenian NPP site, before transportation to the appropriate storage facility, undergoes preliminary treatment, which include:

- Collection:
- Classification according to activity;
- Fragmentation (if needed);
- Packaging;
- Placement in interim containers;
- Transportation and placement in corresponding storage facilities.

Currently no treatment or conditioning technologies for solid radioactive wastes processing are implemented at Armenian NPP site.

Due to the continuous purification technology through the special gas purification system there is no gaseous radioactive waste accumulated at Armenian NPP.

The radioactive waste management facilities existing at Armenian NPP site are included in the Armenian NPP design and are covered by the license issued by ANRA in 2011, renewed in 2021 for operation of Armenian NPP Unit № 2. At the Armenian NPP site there are storage systems for solid low, intermediate and high level wastes, as well as storage systems for liquid radioactive waste.

Information on radioactive waste storage facilities' fullness at the Armenian NPP as of 31.12.2024 is provided in Annex 9 of the national report.

The provisions to control and to minimize the generation of radioactive waste are stipulated in the RA legislation. In particular, the National Strategy stipulates undertaking measures for minimization of the generation of radioactive waste. Similar provision is stipulated in the paragraph 17 of the RA Government Decree № 631-N as of June 04, 2009 on approval of procedure on radioactive waste management. Minimization of the radioactive waste generation is one of the provisions stipulated in the terms and conditions of the license granted by ANRA for operation of the nuclear installation, which is verified during the inspections performed by ANRA.

Furthermore, application of the clearance levels established under the Radiation Safety Norms are also provisions made for radioactive waste minimization.

The guiding and operational documents that regulate the radioactive waste generation are established at Armenian NPP. The mentioned documents regulate the radioactive waste management sequence and procedure, namely the radioactive waste management procedures, responsible persons, solid radioactive waste transportation paths, radioactive waste accounting and monitoring of storage facilities status.

To keep the amount of waste generated at Armenian NPP to the minimum practicable ANPP performs a number of activities and established several procedures and appropriate documentation, such as:

- Program on minimization of solid radioactive waste;
- Guidance on minimization of solid radioactive waste at Armenian NPP.

ANPP developed, approved and agreed with ANRA a "Program of Activities for Management of Existing radioactive waste and generating radioactive waste during the extended lifetime of Armenian NPP unit N 2" (hereinafter - program). The mentioned program has 4 projects aimed at bringing the

radioactive waste management system of Armenian NPP in line with the international and national safety requirements standards.

Overview of ANPP Program and the project's implementation status is presented below:

Project 1 – Improvement of the RW accounting and monitoring system

- The RW accounting service has been improved.
- Work procedures for the RW accounting service have been developed/improved.
- Regulations for RW accounting have been developed/improved.
- Norms for annual RW generation at the ANPP have been revised.

Project 2 - Modernization of the liquid RW processing system

- New deep evaporation facility (DEF) equipment for liquid RW treatment has been procured.
- Certified containers for storing the "salt-cake" residue from the DEF have been procured.
- Installation of the DEF mechanical equipment has been completed and commissioning works are in progress.
- A testing and commissioning program for the DEF is being developed based on the approved acceptance test methodology document.

Project 3 – Modernization of the solid RW processing system

- Technical specifications for the design and construction of the solid RW processing facility have been developed and approved, the tender documentation for its design and construction has been prepared and was conducted, however was not awarded due to non-compliance of the submitted documents with the requirements. Preparations for re-announcement of the tender are ongoing.
- Gamma-ray spectrometry measurement device has been procured and delivered through IAEA National Project.

Project 4 – Establishment of capacities for storage of conditioned RW

Safety assessments for both the solid ILW storage facility and the solid LLW storage facility have been performed.

In addition to the mentioned Program Projects, under the framework of the financial assistance agreement signed with the European Union on "Strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, and radioactive waste management infrastructure in Armenia", the design, technological equipment, and auxiliary tools for establishing a reinforced concrete container and metallic drum fabrication plant will be provided to Armenia for managing ANPP radioactive waste. The contractual terms and conditions governing this project are currently being prepared.

With regard to the construction of the radioactive waste processing facility (Project 3) and the new long-term storage facility (Project 4), financial constraints make it difficult to build the full-scale processing facility and storage facility simultaneously. Therefore, the MTAI and ANPP are considering a phased approach to their construction.

In this context, with the facilitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, meetings were held with organizations from Belgium (Belgoprocess nv) and Slovakia (VUJE) to explore potential cooperation in the design and construction of the radioactive waste processing facility.

The implementation of the Program activities will ensure safe handling of the radioactive waste accumulated at the ANPP and generated within the additional period of operation of the ANPP Unit №2, and could be used for the handling of the RW to be generated from the decommissioning.

The clearance levels are established in the Radiation Safety Norms approved under the RA Government Decree № 1219 as of August 18, 2006 and amended in 2014 aimed to bring them in compliance with the IAEA GSR Part 3.

No radioactive waste clearance is implemented at Armenian NPP.

ANRA performs the regulatory control over the radioactive waste management at Armenian NPP through review of reports (quarterly and annual) on radioactive waste, information on fulfillment of NPP operational license terms and conditions, information on upgrade/modernization of radioactive waste management system, and other documents. Besides, ANRA performs inspections, usually 2-3 planned inspections per year to verify the compliance of radioactive waste management practices at the Armenian NPP with the safety requirements, the current state of activities specified in the submittals and the accuracy of information contained therein, the information on implementation of enforcement actions imposed earlier, etc.

ANNEX 1. THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES RATIFIED BY THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Convention on Early Notification about Nuclear Accident ratified on 22.06.1993

Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency ratified on 22.06.1993

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage ratified on 22.06.1993

Convention on Physical Protection of a Nuclear Material ratified on 22.06.1993

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ratified on 21.12.1993

Convention on Nuclear Safety ratified on 24.09.1997

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ratified on 24.09.1991

Agreement between the Republic Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon signed on 23.09.1993

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for "The Application of Safeguards in connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon ratified on 28.06 2004

Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Armenia ratified on 04.06 2003

Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ratified on 18.03.2013

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management ratified on 21.03.2013

ANNEX 2. GOVERNMENT DECREES ADOPTED IN ATOMIC ENERGY UTILIZATION FIELD

Laws in Atomic Energy Utilization Field

Law on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (01.02.1999, HO-285)

Law of the RA on licensing (30.05.2001, NO-193 with supplements as of 16.03.2004, HO-52N)

Code of the RA on Administrative Offences

Law of the RA on Normative Legal Acts (21.03.2018, HO-180N)

Law of the RA on Civil Service (23.03.2018, HO-205-N)

Law of the RA on Population Protection in case of Emergencies (02.12.1998, HO-265)

Law of the RA on Organization and Conduct of Inspections (17.05.2000, HO-172)

Criminal Code of the RA (05.05.2021) Law of the RA on Administration Bases and Administrative Procedure (18.02.2004, HO-41N)

Law of the RA on Taxes (10.02.1998, HO-12)

Law of the RA on Environmental Impact Assessment and Expertise (21.06.2014, HO-110-N)

Law of the RA on State Authorities (23.03.2018, HO-260-N)

Legal Acts in Atomic Energy Utilization Field

Government Decree № 573 as of 16.11.1993 on establishment of the state authority under the government of the RA on regulation of nuclear and radiation safety for atomic energy utilization (Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority)

Government Decree № 768 as of 22.12.1999 on approval of the list of activities and positions of authority important for safety in atomic energy utilization

Government Decree № 342 as of 25.04.2001 on establishment of the scientific and technical center on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, CJS

Government Decree № 452 as of 24.05.2001 on transfer of responsibilities for regulation of safety of ionizing radiation sources and protection against ionizing radiation in the Republic of Armenia to ANRA

Government Decree № 640 as of 12.07.2001 on approval of the procedure for organization and conduct of safety expertise in the atomic energy utilization field

Government Decree № 765 as of 16.08.2001 on approval of the procedure for registration of ionizing radiation sources

Government Decree № 1263 as of 24.12.2001 on approval of the special rules on transport of nuclear and radioactive materials

Government Decree № 931-N as of 27.06.2002 on approval of the procedure for safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials

Government decree № 1231-N as of 11.09.2003 on approval of the concept of physical protection and security of Armenian NPP and nuclear materials and rules on physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials

Government Decree № 2013-N as of 21.11.2002 on approval of the requirements to form and contents of the Safety Analysis Report of the Armenian NPP Unit 2

Government Decree № 1597-N as of 26.10.2004 on fulfillment of obligations undertaken under the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Government Decree № 1751-N as of 09.12. 2004 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for use of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 1790-N as of 09.12. 2004 on approval of the licensing procedure, license and application form for import and export of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 1791-N as of 09.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for storage of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 1792-N as of 09.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure for transport of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 257-N as of 10.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for designing of systems, structures and components important to safety of atomic energy utilization installation

Government Decree № 258-N as of 10.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for manufacture of systems, structures and components important to safety of atomic energy utilization installation

Government Decree № 259-N as of 10.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for repair of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 260-N as of 10.02. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for installation and calibration of radioactive materials, devices containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 345-N as of 24.03.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for expertise of atomic energy utilization installations, their designs and other documents

Government Decree № 375-N as of 24.03.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for import and export of radioactive wastes

Government Decree № 400-N as of 24.03.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for operation of nuclear installations

Government Decree № 401-N as of 31.03. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for implementation of physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials

Government Decree № 416-N as of 31.03. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for construction of radioactive waste storage facility

Government Decree № 417-N as of 31.03. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for construction of radioactive waste disposal facility

Government Decree № 608-N as of 12.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for designing of nuclear installations

Government Decree № 609-N as of 12.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for site selection of nuclear installations

Government Decree № 647-N as of 05.05.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for storage of radioactive wastes

Government Decree № 649-N as of 12.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for construction of nuclear installations

Government Decree № 652-N as of 19.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for operation of radioactive waste disposal facility

Government Decree № 702-N as of 19.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for operation of radioactive waste storage facility

Government Decree № 703-N as of 19.05. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for reprocessing of radioactive wastes

Government Decree № 707-N as of 01.06. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for decommissioning of nuclear installations

Government Decree № 745-N as of 09.06.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for storage of nuclear materials

Government Decree № 746-N as of 09.06.2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for transport of nuclear materials

Government Decree № 762-N as of 09.06. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for use of nuclear materials

Government Decree № 985-N as of 07.07. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for designing of radioactive waste storage facility

Government Decree № 986-N as of 07.07. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for designing of radioactive waste disposal facility

Government Decree № 1204-N as of 11.08. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for site selection of radioactive waste disposal facility

Government Decree № 2129-N as of 01.12. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for decommissioning of radioactive waste disposal facility

Government Decree № 2140-N as of 01.12. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for manufacture of radioactive materials, equipment containing radioactive materials, or radiation generators

Government Decree № 2141-N as of 01.12. 2005 on approval of the licensing procedure and license form for decommissioning of radioactive waste storage facility

Government Decree № 1219-N as of 18.08.2006 on approval of radiation safety norms

Government Decree № 1489-N as of 18.08.2006 on approval of radiation safety rules

Government Decree № 1858-N as of 14.12.2006 on approval of the licensing procedure, license and application forms and qualification check of individuals implementing practices and holding positions important for safety of atomic energy utilization field

Government Decree № 1859-N as of 14.12.2006 on approval of amendments to RA Government Decree № 768 as of 22.12.1999

Government Decree № 553-N as of 03.05.2007 on approval of procedure on detection and isolation of radioactive materials

Ordinance of RA President № 121-N as of 20.02.2008 of reorganization of Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) under Ministry for Nature Protection of RA into State Committee under Government of RA on nuclear safety regulation and amendment of RA President Ordinance № NH-1063 adopted on 16 March 2002

Government Decree № 587-A as of 29 May 2009 on recognition of the Regulatory Authority

Government Decree N 631-N as of 04.06.2009 on approval of the procedure on radioactive waste management

Government Decree № 418-N as of 05.04.2012 on approval of procedure on investigation of NPP operational events

Government Decree № 461-N as of 19.04.2012 on approval of extension of design lifetime of Armenian NPP Unit No2

Government Decree № 1085-N as of 23.08.2012 on approval of the requirements to extension of design lifetime for Armenian NPP Unit No2 operation

Government Decree № 1411-N as of 08.11.2012 on approval of Design Safety Requirements to New NPP Unit(s).

Government Decree № 1546-N as of 13.12.2012 on approval of Method on Seismic Hazard Assessment for New Nuclear Unit Site.

Government Decree № 708-N as of 04.07.2013 on approval of site safety requirements to new NPP Unit(s);

Government Decree № 709-N as of 04.07.2013 on approval of list of internal legal acts applied in atomic energy utilization field in Russian and in English.

Government Decree №985-A as of 13.09.2013 on appointment of competent authorities for implementation of obligations established in the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In accordance with the Decree ANRA and the National Security Service of the RA are recognized as the competent authorities within their respective jurisdictions.

RA Government Decree №14-N adopted on 14.01.2016 on approval of rules on physical protection of radioactive materials and devices containing radioactive materials

RA Government Decree №475-N as of 11.06.2017 on approval of rules on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear installations

RA Prime Minister Decree №747-L as of 11.06.2018 on approval of ANRA statute

Subordinate Legal Acts in Atomic Energy Utilization Field

Requirements to format and content of conclusion on safety expertise in atomic energy utilization field (Registered by the Ministry of Justice of RA. Registration № 10503349 as of 12.11.2003)

Establishment of Armenian NPP emergency planning zones (Registered by the Ministry of Justice of RA. Registration № 12506129 as of 04.05.2006)

Statute and procedure on formation of commission on qualification check of physical persons holding positions and implementing practices important to safety in atomic energy utilization field (Registered by the Ministry of Justice of RA. Registration № 12507398 as of 21.11.2007)

Requirements to content and form of program on decommissioning of nuclear installations (Registered by the Ministry of Justice of RA. Registration № 12511432 as of 27.09.2011)

Requirements on accounting of radioisotopic and ionizing radiation sources at atomic energy utilization installations (Registered by the Ministry of Justice of RA. Registration № 12512188 as of 11.04.2012)

Joint order of ANRA Chairman, RA Minister of Agriculture and RA Minister of Healthcare on approval of Educational Program on Preparedness to Withstand Infectious Diseases, Chemical and Radiation

Hazards and the Time Schedule Included in the Program (registered by the Ministry of Justice under the Registration № 1001201 on 18.01.2012)

Requirements to format and content of radiation monitoring system of the nuclear installations (registered by the Ministry of Justice under the Registration № 12512230 on 31.05.2012)


Requirements to form and maintaining the individual occupational radiation cards (registered by the Ministry of Justice under the Registration № 12513109 on 25.03.2013)

Requirements to format and content of comprehensive survey report (registered by the Ministry of Justice under the Registration №12516039 on 04.02.2016)


ANNEX 3. ROAD MAP

Timing	Measure	Possible EU assistance
	The new Law of the Republic of Armenia on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes	
End of 2024	Development – "0" draft	
1st half of 2025	Expertize (IAEA, EU)	
2nd half of 2025	Revision of the draft taking into account the results of the expertize and Submission to the Government	Expertize
2026	Submission of the final draft to the Government of the RA	
	Ascertain compliance with the requirements of the European Union Safety Directives	
5 years after the entry into force CEPA	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2006/117/EURATOM of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel	Expertize
4 years after the entry into force CEPA	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations	Expertize
4 years after the entry into force CEPA	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste	Expertize
5 years after the entry into force CEPA	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2013/51/EURATOM of 22 October 2013 laying down requirements for the protection of the health of the general public with regard to radioactive substances in water intended for human consumption	Expertize
5 years after the entry into force CEPA	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2013/59/EURATOM of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom	Expertize

ANNEX 4. POSITION OF ANRA IN THE RA GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE



ANNEX 5. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANRA



ANNEX 6. RADIATION PROTECTION

Table 1. Annual Allowable Release of Radioactive Gases and Airborne into the Atmosphere

Radionuclide	WWER NPP
Noble gases [TBq]	690
¹³¹ I [GBq] (gas and airborne)	18
⁶⁰ Co [GBq]	7.4
¹³⁴ Cs [GBq]	0.9
¹³⁷ Cs [GBq]	2.0

Table 2. Control Levels for Release of Radioactive Gases and Airborne into the Atmosphere per Month

Radionuclides	WWER NPP
Nobel gases [TBq]	57
¹³¹ I [GBq] (gas and aerosols)	1.5
⁶⁰ Co [MBq]	620
¹³⁴ Cs [MBq]	75
¹³⁷ Cs [MBq]	170




Figure 1. Annual Collective Equivalent Exposure Dose of Armenian NPP Personnel for the period 1977-2024




Figure 2. Individual Equivalent Annual Maximum Exposure Dose of Armenian NPP Personnel for the period 1988-2024




Figure 3. Annual Releases of Long-Lived Radionuclides (T1/2 more 24 hours) for the period of the Armenian NPP operation




Figure 4. The annual activities of liquid discharges from Armenian NPP in the period of operation




Figure 5. The main contribution to the annual release.

Environmental Radiation Monitoring Results for 2024

Table 3. The contamination of atmosphere* in the Armenian NPP supervised area in 2021 [10⁻⁴ Bq/m³]

Name of location	Volumetric beta activity (av. for year)
Armenian NPP - 0.3 km	0.45
Metsamor town - 5 km	0.59

Table 4. Concentration of radionuclides in atmospheric air of the NPP supervised area in 2021 (10^{-4} Bq/m³)

	Sampling points							
Isotope	NPP	Metsamor	Pond	Average for				
	0,3 km	5 km	11km	area				
	First quarter							
¹³⁷ Cs	0.002	0.018	0.004	0.003				
⁹⁰ Sr	bds	bds	bds	bds				
⁷ Be	43.89	6	8.3	6.3				
		Second quarter						
¹³⁷ Cs	0.011	0.01	0.071	0.03				
⁹⁰ Sr	bds	0.002	0.002	0.001				
⁷ Be	8.9	18	12	12.9				

		Third quarter		
¹³⁷ Cs	0.028	0.036	0.056	0.04
⁹⁰ Sr	bds	bds	bds	bds
⁷ Be	9.3	19	6.8	11.7
		Fourth quarter		
¹³⁷ Cs	bds	0.026	0.034	0.02
⁹⁰ Sr	bds	0.002	bds	0.0006
⁷ Be	11	5.47	19.6	12

Table 5. Specific β -activity of soil in 2021 (Bq/kg)

N of	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
control								
point								
$\Sigma \beta$ -	440	410	360	440	390	450	480	365
activity								

N of control	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
point									
$\Sigma \beta$ -activity	302	313	310	190	257	329	238	312	289

^{1 –}Metsamor c.; 2 – Aknalich ; 3 – The NPP aspiration device; 4 –Echmiadzin c.; 5 –Aygeshat v.; 6 – Mughan v.; 7 – Nairi v.; 8 – ANPP site (average from 4 measurements);

Table 6. Radionuclides activity in soil and vegetation in 2021 (Bq/kg).

G1ii-4	S	oil	Vege	
Sampling point	¹³⁷ Cs	⁹⁰ Sr	av. fo	or rad. ⁹⁰ Sr
	NPI		L	7.51
NPP-1(DSNFSF)	16.8	bds		
NPP – 2	12	0.02		
NPP – 3	6.9	0.03	6.2	bds
NPP – 4	4.3	0.02		
Average for NPP	10	0.023		
	1 Rad	ius	•	
NPP asp. Fac.	24.1	0.015		
Aknalich	9.2	bds	4.6	bds
Metsamor	7.6	0.06		
Average for 1 rad.	13.6	0.025		
	2 Rad	ius		
Aigeshat	4.3	0.018	bds	bds
Echmiadzin	10.4	0.04		
Average for 2 rad.	7.35	0.029		
	3 Rad	ius		

Mughan	1.3	0.03		
Nairi	9.4	0.02	bds	bds
Average for 3 rad.	5.4	0.025		
Average for zone	9.1	0.026	2.7	bds

Table 7. Specific β-activity of vegetation in 2021 (Bq/kg)

№ of control point	NPP	1 Radius	2 Radius	3 Radius
Σβ-activity	281	324	348	455

Table 8. Specific β-activity of bed silts and their concentration of radio nuclides in 2021 (Bq/kg)

Control points	Specific	Radio	nuclides
	β-activity	¹³⁷ Cs	⁹⁰ Sr
Lake Aknalich	539	0.2	bds
Fishery Facility	431	0.4	bds
Service Water Supply Pump Facility	471	0.3	bds
Drinking Water Sampling for Metsamor	490	bds	bds
Water Sampling for the Pump Facility	380	0.6	bds
Drinking Water Sampling for Armavir	390	0.3	bds
Sanitary Sewage Discharge Point	430	0.6	bds
Site Rainwater Sewage Discharge Point	330	0.62	bds

Table 9. Specific β-activity of algae and their concentration of radio nuclides in 2021 (Bq/kg)

Control points	Specific	Radio	nuclides
	β-activity	¹³⁷ Cs	⁹⁰ Sr
Lake Aknalich	225	0.2	bds
Fishery Facility	190	0.1	bds
Service Water Supply Pump Facility	197	0.4	bds
Drinking Water Sampling for Metsamor	167	0.1	bds
Water Sampling for the Pump Facility	188	0.5	bds
Drinking Water Sampling for Armavir	190	0.1	bds
Sanitary Sewage Discharge Point	262	0.6	bds
Site Rainwater Sewage Discharge Point	128	0.09	bds

Table 10. Observation data of deep well sanitary-protective area and the NPP area, the specific β-activity

of observation well water in 2021 (Bq/l)

N of well		1	9	10	25	27
Σ β-activity	1 measurement	0.23	0.15	0.13	0.16	0.14
Σ β-activity	2 measurement	0.08	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.11

Table 11. Total β -activity of open well water in 2021 (Bq/l)

Measurement	Control points							
	1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8						
1	0.24	0.27	0.17	0.24	0.17	0.25	0.3	0.24
2	0.16	0.2	0.2	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.2	0.18

1 – Lake Aknalich, 2 – Fishery Facility, 3 – Service Water Supply Pump Facility, 4 – Drinking Water Sampling for Metsamor, 5 – Water Sampling for the Pump Facility, 6 – Drinking Water Sampling for Armavir, 7 – Sanitary Sewage Discharge Point, 8 – Site Rainwater Sewage Discharge Point, 9

Table 12. Cs-137 radionuclide concentration in open well water in 2021 (Bq/l)

Measurement	Control points							
	1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8						8
1st half year	bds	0.08	bds	bds	bds	bds	0.1	0.06
2 nd half year	bds	bds	0.07	0.1	0.07	bds	0.06	0.07


1 – Lake Aknalich, 2 – Fishery Facility, 3 – Service Water Supply Pump Facility, 4 – Drinking Water Sampling for Metsamor, 5 – Water Sampling for the Pump Facility, 6 – Drinking Water Sampling for Armavir, 7 – Sanitary Sewage Discharge Point, 8 – Site Rainwater Sewage Discharge Point,

Table 13. Sr-90 radionuclides concentration in open well water in 2021 (Bq/l)


Measurement	Control points							
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8							
1st half year	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds
2 nd half year	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds	bds

Pump Facility, 4 – Drinking Water Sampling for Metsamor, 5 – Water Sampling for the Pump Facility, 6 – Drinking Water Sampling for Armavir, 7 – Sanitary Sewage Discharge Point, 8 – Site Rainwater Sewage Discharge Point

ANNEX 7. SCHEME OF ANRA EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND INTERACTION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS



ANNEX 8. ARMENIAN NPP NOTIFICATION SCHEME



ANNEX 9. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

Fullness of radioactive waste storage facilities at the Armenian NPP as of 31.12.20224

No	Stamaga facility	Storage	Accumula	ated RW	Notes
1/10	Storage facility	capacity m3	m3	% (fullness)	Notes
1.	Solid LLW storage facility	17051	7198.36	42.21	
2.	Solid ILW storage facility	1001,3	496.33	49.57	Incl. 383.66m ³ "salt cake" (1774 DEF cont.)
3.	Solid HLW storage facility	78.34	38	48.5	
4.	DEF containers temporary storage site	Max. 3000 container	435.16 (1978 DEF containers)	100	
5.	Liquid LLW storage facility	510			Due to the continuous evaporation there are no accumulated liquids.
6.	Liquid ILW storage facility (6 ECT, HLST-1)	3170	2494	78.67	
7.	Liquid HLW storage facility (HLST-2)	350	279	79.71	

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
AMS Ageing management system

ANRA Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

Armenian NPP
Armenian Nuclear Power Plant
ARS
Armenian Rescue Service
BDBA
Beyond Design Basis Accident
BDBE
Beyond Design Basis Earthquake
BNL
Brookhaven National Laboratory
CES
Commission on Emergency Situations

CDF Core Damage Frequency
CMC Crisis Management Centre
DBA Design Basis Accident
DEF Deep Evaporation Facility

DG Diesel Generator

DGS Diesel Generator Station
DSFSF Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility

EAR Event Analysis Report EC European Commission

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

ENR Event Notification Report

ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ERC Emergency Response Center

EU European Union

EWRMS Early Warning Radiation Monitoring System

"HAEK" CJSC "ANPP" CJSC ("Armenian Nuclear Power Plant" Closed Joint

Stock Company)

HLW High level waste

HPES Human Performance Evaluation System
IGALL International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned
INES International Nuclear Event Scale Information Service

ILW Intermediate low level waste

IAEAInternational Atomic Energy AgencyICMTSIn-core monitoring technological systemICSInformation and computation systemINSCInstrument for Nuclear Safety CooperationINSSPIntegrated Nuclear Security Support Plan

IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IPSART International Probabilistic Safety Analysis Review Team

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Services

IRS Incident Reporting System

ISPS Industrial seismic protection system

I&C Instrumentation and Control

JRODOS Java based version of RODOS (Real-time On-line Decision

Support system)

HSM Horizontal storage module

LLW Low level waste

LOCALoss of Coolant AccidentLTELifetime ExtensionLTOLong Term Operation

MCR Main Control Room MCP Main Circulation Pipe

MELCOR Severe Accident Analysis Codes MES Ministry of Emergency Situations

MFS Multi-functional Simulator

NACP National Action Plan NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NRSC Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center NTD Normative and technical documentation

OE Operational Experience

OSART Operational Safety Review Team
OED Operational Experience Department

PAZ Preventive Actions Zone
PGA Peak Ground Acceleration

PR Peer Review
PRT Peer Review Team

PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment

PROSPER Peer review of the Effectiveness of the Operational Safety

Performance Experience Review

PRZ Pressurizer

PTS Pressurized Thermal Shock
QMS Quality Management System

RA Republic of Armenia RF Russian Federation

RLE Reviewed Level Earthquake

RW Radioactive waste

SSC Systems, Structures and Components

QA Quality Assurance

RCP Reactor Circulation Pump

RDGS Redundant Diesel Generator Station

SALTO Peer Review Service on Safe Long-Term Operation

SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines

SAR Safety Analysis Report

SAT Systematic Approach to Training

SG Steam Generator

SOER Significant Operating Experience Report

SOEOP Symptom-oriented Emergency Operating Procedures

TLD Thermo-luminescence Dosimeter

TSR-PSA Technical Safety Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment

US NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

US DOE United States Department of Energy UPZ Urgent Protective Actions Zone

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

WOG ERG Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines

WWER Water-cooled Water-moderated Energetic Reactor